COMMENT
DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE FREEDOM
OF INFORMATION ACT-1973
INTRODUCTION

Congress enacted the Freedom of Information Act1 (FOIA) in
1966 as a reaction to the abuses of the Public Information section
of the Administrative Procedure Act,2 which effectively enabled the
agencies to withhold information from the public at the agency's dis-

cretion.3

The FOIA generally requires full agency disclosure of all

executive branch materials,4 unless the information sought is exempted

from disclosure by nine specifically stated exemptions. 5

Moreover,

the FOIA authorizes de novo judicial review of an agency's refusal

to disclose information to any person who properly requests it.6 Since
its inception, the FOIA has been plagued by its vague and ambiguous
statutory language.7 Furthermore, judicial reliance upon the Act's legislative history has produced conflicting results, since the House and
1. Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 56, as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
HEREAFTER THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS
COMMENT:
S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No.
8131;
H.R. REp. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP.
No. 14971;
Note, Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-1972, 1973 DUKE
L.. 178, in 1972 Developments [hereinafter cited as FOIA Note];
UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JusTicE ATTORNEY GENERAL's MEMORANDUM ON THE
PUBLIC INFORMATION SECTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (1967) [hereinafter cited as ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM].

2. Ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 238 (1946).
3. See S. REP. No. 813, at 3-5; H.R. REP. No. 1497, at 4-6.
4. See S. REP. No. 813, at 3; H.R. R-P. No. 1497, at 1.
5. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9) (1970).
6. Id.§ 552(a)(3).
7. Some authorities have accused the agencies of utilizing this poor draftsmanship
to wrongfully withhold agency information from the public. See, e.g., HousE COMMrrTEE ON GovERNmENT OPERuTIONs, ADMINISTRATION OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION

ACT, H.R. REP. No. 1419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1972); Katz, The Games Bureaucrats Play: Hide and Seek Under the Freedom of Information Act, 48 TEXAS L. Rnv.
1261, 1262 (1970); 1970 Developments 149, 192-93; Note, Freedom of Information:
The Statute and the Regulations, 56 GEo. L.. 18, 52-53 (1967). See generally Davis,
The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHI. L REv. 761, 762, 802-12
(1967).
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Senate Reports8 are often internally inconsistent and in conflict not
only with each other but also with the plain import of the statutory
language. 9
The reluctance of the agencies to disclose governmental informa-

tion voluntarily, coupled with the ambiguities and inconsistencies inherent in the Act and its legislative history, were undoubtedly factors
contributing to the heavy volume of litigation concerning the FOIA

in 1973. During 1973, the courts rendered significant interpretations
of six of the Act's nine exemptions. They also clarified the meaning of "agency" under the Act, further defined the term "identifiable

records" which an "agency" must make available upon a proper request, and more precisely delineated the burden of proof which an

"agency" must bear when it refuses to accede to such a request.

This

Comment describes these developments, attempts to evaluate their

soundness in light of prior judicial interpretations of the FOIA, and
endeavors to assess the impact of these developments on the Act's

underlying general policy favoring the disclosure of information acquired by the federal government.
EXECUTIVE ORDER EXEMPTION

In EPA v. Mink,'" the Supreme Court's first consideration of the
FOIA, Justice White, writing for the majority," laid down guidelines

for the scope of judicial review appropriate to the executive order
exemption' 2 of the FOIA.13

The executive order exemption provides

that matters "specifically required by executive order to be kept secret
in the interests of the national defense or foreign policy"' 4 are exempt
from the mandatory disclosure provisions of the Act. In Mink, Congresswoman Patsy Mink and thirty-two of her colleagues sought release

of a collection of documents compiled for the President as a report
8. S. REP.No.813; H.R. REP. No. 1497.
9. For examples of such conflicts and inconsistencies, see notes 140-46, 167, 17680 infra and accompanying text.
10. 410U.S. 73 (1973).
11. Justice Stewart concurred, id. at 94. Justices Brennan and Marshall concurred
in part and dissented in part, id.at 95. Justice Douglas dissented, id.at 105. For
an initial reaction to Mink, see 42 U. CiN. L. REv. 529 (1973).
12. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1970).
13. For an assessment of the impact of the Mink Court's interpretation of the executive order exemption on the statutory exemption of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)
(3) (1970), see notes 56-70 infra and accompanying text. The Court directly considered the FOIA exemption for intra-agency memoranda. Id. § 552(b)(5).
This
aspect of the Court's opinion is discussed in notes 101-21 infra and accompanying text.
Finally, the Mink decision's impact on an agency's burden of proving the applicability
of a claimed exemption is discussed in notes 235-51 infra and accompanying text.
14. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1970).
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of the National Security Council concerning a proposed underground
nuclear test.Yi Disclosure of certain of these documents was refused on
the ground that they were protected by the executive order exemption."6
Although each of these documents was classified Secret or Top Secret by
executive order, some were so classified without regard to the content

of the particular document but pursuant to an "umbrella!' classification
provision of Executive Order 10501'7 which provides for classification

of information according to that of its highest classified component.' 8
Apparently focusing on the exemption's demand for a specific

15. The documents sought were listed by the Supreme Court in its opinion. 410
U.S. at 76 n.3. Generally, they included the report of the Under Secretaries Committee of the National Security Council and several letters and other documents attached
to the report, all of which concerned the anticipated effects of the proposed underground nuclear test, known as "Cannikin," scheduled to occur at Amchitka Island,
Alaska. Id. at 76. By the time the matter reached the Supreme Court, EPA only
claimed executive order exemption status for six of the documents. Id. at 77. These
six documents were classified Secret or Top Secret pursuant to Executive Order
10501, 3 C.F.R. 979 (1949-53 Comp.), as amended, 3 C.F.R. 292 (1971), 50 U.S.C.
§ 401 (1970), which has been superceded as of June 1, 1972 by Executive Order
11652, 3 C.F.R. 375 (1973). The latter order similarly provides for the classification
of material in the interest of the national defense or foreign relations. Id. For a
comparison and analysis of the two executive orders, see note 18 infra and Hearings on
U.S. Government Information Policies and Practices-Administrationand Operation of
the Freedom of Information Act Before a Subcomm. df the House Comm. on Government Operations, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 7, at 2849-83 (1972); for an examination
of the two orders, including the constitutional, common law, and statutory bases for
the orders, see Note, Secrecy in the Conduct of U.S. Foreign Relations: Recent Policy
and Practice,6 CORNELL INTL' L.J 187 (1973).

16. Alternatively, the government claimed that the intra-agency memorandum exemption, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1970), protected all of the documents. 410 U.S. at
85. See notes 101-09 infra and accompanying text.
17. See note 15 supra.
18. Executive Order 10501, 3 C.F.R. 979 (1949-53 Comp.), as amended, 3 C.F.R.
292 (1971), 50 U.S.C. § 401 (1970), pt. (3) (c), provided in pertinent part:
Multiple Classification. A document, product, or substance shall bear a
classification at least as high as that of its highest classified component. The
document, product, or substance shall bear only one over-all classification,
notwithstanding that pages, paragraphs, sections, or components thereof bear
different classifications.
Compare Executive Order 11652, 3 C.F.L 375 (1973), the order currently in effect,
which provides in section 4(A) that " to the extent practicable" documents shall be
classified to indicate "which portions of the documents are classified and which are not"
in order to "facilitate excerpting and other use." (Emphasis added.)
Executive Order 10501 delegates the authority to classify documents as Secret or
Top Secret to "the departments, agencies, and other units of the executive branch
[therein]," 3 C.F.R. 293 (1971). It has been estimated that over 5,100 government
officers had original Top Secret classification authority under this executive order.
Executive Order 11652, 3 C.F.R. 375 (1973), which replaced the former order, has reduced the number to approximately 1,860 government employees. The Mink Court
noted that despite this widespread delegation, "the authority itself . ..remains the
President's and it is his judgment that the first exemption was designed to respect." 410
U.S. at 82 n.8.
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requirement of governmental secrecy, 19 the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit concluded in part that the executive order
exemption permits only secret portions of documents which are separately classified to be withheld.20 Accordingly, it reversed the summary judgment for the government2 l and remanded the case to the
trial court, ordering it to review the documents in camera to determine
whether the "nonsecret components of the documents are separable
from the secret remainder and may be read separately without distortion of meaning ' '22 and are therefore subject to disclosure under the
FOIA.
On appeal the Supreme Court reversed, taking exception to
the scope of the judicial inquiry ordered by the appellate court. 28 Justice White, writing for the majority, indicated that the executive order
exemption sets out a simple, concrete test chosen by Congress to dispel
all uncertainty in determining whether requested information is
eligible under the exemption for protection from disclosure: that test
is "whether the President has determined by Executive order that particular documents are to be kept secret."2 4 Thus, Justice White concluded that no judicial review is authorized by the FOIA beyond determining whether the Executive so classified the desired documents.
An affidavit on behalf of the government which stated that each requested document was classified pursuant to an executive order and
involved matters of national defense and foreign policy, was held sufficient to preclude subjecting the "soundness of executive security
classifications to judicial review ....

"2I

The explicit language of

the exemption thus prevents a court from ordering an "in camera inspection of a contested document bearing a single classification [in
order to] separate the secret from the supposedly nonsecret and
order the disclosure of the latter."20 The majority opinion noted that
Congress could have chosen other classification procedures or ordered
19. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
20. Mink v. EPA, 464 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1972), rev'd, 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
21.
at 745.
22.
at 746. The court further stated:
Under our remand, the District Court will take evidence on whether, and
to what extent, the file contains documents that are now within the umbrella
of a secret file but which would not have been independently classified as secret. Such documents are not entitled to the secrecy exemption of subdivision
(b)(1) solely by virtue of their association with separately classified documents.
23. 410 U.S. at 84.
24.
at 82.
25.
at 84.
26.
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the executive branch to adopt new procedures,17 but instead chose
to leave the disclosure of the information solely to the discretion of
the President.28
Justice White did not attempt to reconcile the Court's interpretation of the executive order exemption, which placed significant restraints upon the scope of permissible judicial inquiry, with the emphasis of subsection (a) (3) of the Act, which provides that "the [district]
court shall determine the [validity of a request for identifiable records]
de novo and the burden is on the agency to sustain its action."2
This apparent conflict formed the basis of Justice Brennan's dissent.3 0
He argued forcefully that the de novo judicial review provision of the
FOIA applies with equal force to all exemptions, including the executive order exemption. 3 In contrast, the majority opinion implicitly
27. Id. at 83. The Court noted that the Executive's determination of secrecy is
"subject only to whatever limitations the Executive privilege may be held to impose
upon such congressional ordering. Cf. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953)."
Id.
28. Id.
29. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (3) (1970). For a more complete discussion of this provision for de novo judicial review, see notes 228-51 infra and accompanying text.
Although the majority opinion in Mink does not refer to any previous FOIA decisions interpreting the executive order exemption, the 1970 case of Epstein v. Resor,
421 F.2d 930 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970), offers an analysis that
might resolve the apparent conflict. In Epstein, an historian sought to enjoin the Secretary of the Army from withholding a file---'Forcible Repatriation of Displaced Soviet
Citizens--Operation Keelhaul"-classified as Top Secret by an executive order. Upholding the government's claim that the executive order exemption of the FOIA
protected the documents from mandatory disclosure, the Epstein court suggested that the
executive order exemption was couched in terms significantly different from the other
exemptions of the FOIA (excluding the statutory exemption, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (3)
(1970), which provides exemption for matters "specifically exempted from disclosure
by statute"). (For additional discussion of the similarity of these two exemptions, see
notes 56-65 supra and accompanying text.) This difference, the court observed, lies
in the fact that the executive order exemption utilizes a criterion outside of the FOIA
to determine the susceptibility of the information to compulsory disclosure-whether
the matter is "specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret"--while the
other exemptions (excluding the statutory exemption) require the court to determine
whether the underlying factual contentions meet the internal criteria of loosely constructed FOIA provisions. Id. at 933.
30. 410 U.S. at 95.
31. Id. at 96-100.
Obviously, a major concern of the majority was the traditional power of the President to determine the secrecy of matters relating to the national security. This is evidenced by the Court's criticism of the approach of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which would "subject executive security classifications to judicial review at the insistence of anyone who might seek to question them." Id. at
82.
In response, Justice Brennan contended that this argument "misconceives" the
court of appeal's holding; that it only ordered the district court to determine "if the
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suggests that less judicial involvement is permitted by the executive

order exemption than is required by the remainder of the exemptions.
The Court's holding reduces the judiciary's function in such a hearing
to a mere determination of whether there exists an executive order

of secrecy relating to the matter in question rather than requiring a
determination of whether that order specifically prohibits the matter's
disclosure.32 Justice Brennan's position draws support from the commentators33 and from the relevant legislative history which emphasizes
that a court's review is not to become a "meaningless judicial sanctioning
'3 4

of agency discretion.
Although the majority opinion in Mink offers some support for
its interpretation of the executive order exemption,"5 its attempt at

statutory construction is cursory and unpersuasive. One natural reading of the executive order exemption suggests several independent

criteria for exemption:
required (3)

(1) the "matter' 30 Must (2) be specifically

by executive order to be kept secret (4) in the interest of

non-secret components were separable from the secret remainder . . . ." Id. at 99,
quoting 464 F.2d at 746. "The determination whether any components are in fact
'non-secret' is left exclusively to the agency head representing the executive branch."
Id. The practical problems inherent in Brennan's approach are, however, evidenced
by his own immediately subsequent statement. "The District Court's authority stops
with the inquiry whether there are components of the documents that would not have
been independently classified [by the executive branch] as secret." Id. at 100 (emphasis added). Thus, such an assessment of the government's classification would necessarily require the district court to reach an independent judgment regarding the documents' proper classification, despite Justice Brennan's initial argument to the contrary.
32. See discussion at notes 56-63, 116-21 infra and accompanying text.
33. See, e.g., Developments in the Lav: The National Security Interest and Civil
Liberties, 85 HARv. L. Rnv. 1130, 1222 (1972); Note, supranote 7, at 30.
34. S. REP. No. 813, at 8; H.R. REP. No. 1497, at 9. Congress thus rejected the
traditional rule of judicial deference to agency determinations. 410 U.S. at 101 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
35. The Court based its construction of the statutory language on its perception
of a congressional intent to set out a concrete standard. 410 U.S. at 82. The strongest
legislative history cited by the Court in support of its interpretation states in pertinent
part:
[Clitizens both in and out of Government can agree to restrictions on categories of information which the President has determined must be kept secret
to protect the national defense or to advance foreign policy, such as matters
classified pursuant to Executive Order 10501. H.R. REP. No. 1497, at 9-10.
The Attorney General's Memorandum interprets this reference to Executive Order
10501 as indicating "that no great degree of specificity is contemplated in identifying
matters subject to [the executive order] exemption." ATroRNEy GENERAL'S Mr.oRANDUM 30.
36. Nowhere in the FOIA or its legislative history is the scope of "matter" defined. In particular reference to the executive order exemption, the House Report refers to "categories of information." H.R. RP. No. 1497, at 9. The Senate Report
variously refers to the nine exemptions of the Act as protecting "categories of matters,"
S. REP. No. 813, at 8, and "limited types of information." Id. at 5.
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national defense or foreign policy."

However, the Court's interpretation

does not consider these criteria individually. By condoning the umbrella
classification procedure of the relevant executive order, which classi-

fies an entire document at the level of its highest classified component,"8 the Court effectively eliminates the "specifically required"
criterion from the exemption. A probable explanation of the Court's

liberal reading is the historical reluctance of the judiciary to scrutinize
rigorously matters claimed to be within the Executive's privilege. 39 In

the landmark case of United States v. Reynolds,40 the Supreme Court
placed severe restrictions upon a court's power to order an in camera

inspection of documents when confronted by a claim of executive priv-

ilege. 41 However, the practical effect of the Mink interpretation of
the executive order exemption is to place restraints upon judicial review even beyond those imposed by the traditional doctrine of executive privilege. Under executive privilege, the judiciary is at least not

forced wholly to abdicate its control over the evidence;42 it is the trial
court which must determine the validity of the claim of executive privi-

lege. 43 The Mink interpretation by contrast leaves an executive classification of secrecy totally immune from judicial review. It is doubtful

that Congress, without having extensively considered the executive
37. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1970) (numeration added). See 410 U.S. at 95 (Brennan, I., dissenting).
38. See note 18 supra.
39. The majority opinion of the Court does not discuss executive privilege in this
context and claims to be concerned only with the construction and scope of the executive order exemption. 410 U.S. at 74. Justice Stewart in his concurring opinion explicitly denies that the case presents constitutional and executive privilege issues. Id.
at 94. For a general discussion of executive privilege, see Bishop, The Executive's Right of Privacy: An Unresolved Constitutional Question, 66 YALE L.J. 477
(1957). Prior to the passage of the FOIA, the citizen's primary encounter with executive privilege was in a litigation context. See 4 J. MooRE & J. LUCAS, MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRAcncE 126.61 (1972 ed.); 8 J. WIGMoRE, EViDENCE §§ 2212, 2369-71, 237879 (McNaughton rev. 1961). See also 49 TFxAs L. Rnv. 780, 781 n.9 (1971) and
the articles cited therein.
40. 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
41. In Reynolds, the plaintiffs, widows of civilian observers killed in a crash of
a military aircraft on a flight to test secret electronic equipment, moved under the appropriate discovery rule for the production of the Air Force's accident investigation
report. In assessing the Secretary of the Air Force's claim of executive privilege, the
Court held that it is the duty of the trial court to look at all the circumstances to
ascertain whether there is a reasonable danger that disclosure of the documents would
expose matters that, in the interest of national security, should not be revealed, even
to the court. The court should not order in camera review of the documents if.the
government can demonstrate from all the circumstances that there is reasonable danger
that disclosure would jeopardize national security.
42. See 345 U.S. at 9-10; Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 400 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
43. See 345 U.S, at 8; Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 400 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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privilege doctrine,4 4 intended to immunize an executive decision to

maintain the secrecy of information from meaningful judicial review
by a statute whose essential purpose is to delimit executive discretion
to withhold information from the public.

In this regard, Senator Muskie recently proposed an amendment"8
to the FOIA which would broaden the scope of de novo judicial review. Pursuant to the proposed amendment a court would be empowered to question the Executive's claim of secrecy by examining the

classified records in camera in order to determine whether "disclosure
would be harmful to the national defense or foreign policy of the

United States. 14 6 This proposal, however, extends judicial authority
too far into the political decision-making process, a field not appropriately within the province of the courts. 47 A more satisfactory legislative solution would be a judicial procedure which would not unduly
restrict the Executive's prerogative to determine what should remain
secret in the national interest but which would simultaneously provide
a limited judicial check on arbitrary and capricious executive determinations. 48 An acceptable compromise of these competing interests
44. See 49 TExAs L. REv. 780, 785-86 (1971).
45. S. 1142, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
46. Id. at 4. See H.R. 12471, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); see note 239 infra.
47. See Epstein v. Resor, 421 F.2d 930, 933 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965
(1970).
48. A similar position was early advocated by United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S.
1 (1953); see note 41 supra. In Epstein v. Resor, 421 F.2d 930 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970), the scope of judicial inquiry under the executive order exemption was somewhat more limited to an investigation of the origin of the secret file's
contents and the surrounding circumstances, thus precluding an in camera inspection
of the file. After determining that the judiciary was ill-equipped to make the political
decision of classifying information pursuant to national security needs, and hence, that
this matter is not one appropriately within the authority of the court, id. at 933, the
Epstein court interpreted the executive order exemption to permit only a judicial determination whether classification within the first exemption is clearly arbitrary and
unsupportable. Id. The Mink Court, however, adopted an even more judicially conservative position by indicating that judicial activity was to be strictly limited to determining whether in fact the disputed information was within the purview of an executive order. 410 U.S. at 82. One distinguishing factor between the cases might be that
in Mink, the characterization of the documents as to whether their secrecy was demanded for national defense or foreign policy reasons was not questioned. Id. at 84.
Cf. Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 826-28 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W.
3523 (U.S. Mar. 19, 1974).
A possible exception to the conservative judicial role posited by Mink might therefore exist where an allegation was made that the government's claim of protecting national defense or foreign policy through nondisclosure was totally without foundation
or fraudulent. One case providing some support for such an exception is Wolfe v.
Froehlke, 358 F. Supp. 1318, 1320 (D.D.C. 1973).
The Wolfe opinion is a reconsideration, after a change in circumstances, of the
applicability of the executive order exemption to the same classified Department of

Vol. 1974:251J

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-1973

might be a procedure whereby the agency asserting the privilege

would separately classify each document and portions thereof and prepare a detailed itemization and index of this classification scheme for
the court. 49 Thus, the court could adequately ascertain whether the
claim of privilege was based upon a reasoned determination rather

than an arbitrary classification without subjecting the material to in
camera scrutiny. Such a procedure would prevent indiscriminate and
arbitrary classification yet not unduly infringe upon the privilege of

the Executive to protect national secrets.
STATUTORY EXEMPTION

When interpreting the exemption for "matters" "specifically exempted from disclosure by [another federal] statute," 50 courts generally have examined the degree of specificity with which the other stat-

ute describes the particular government documents it attempts to protect. Section 1905 of the Criminal Code 51 is perhaps the broadest
non-disclosure statute which has been claimed by the federal agencies

to exempt material from the disclosure provisions of the FOTA. Section 1905 provides criminal sanctions against an agency employee who
discloses, "to any extent not authorized by law,"' 52 commercial or financial information to which he has gained access through his position
with the government. A 1972 case, M.A. Schapiro & Co. v. SEC, 53
Defense file unsuccessfully sought in the Epstein case. The document sought retained
its security classification solely because the British government refused to concur with
the Defense Department in its declassification. Applying the test set forth in Mink
(see note 24 supra and accompanying text) the court refused to order the documents
disclosed reasoning that: "The realm of foreign relations is as inappropriate for judicial
intervention as is the realm of national security. . . ." 358 F. Supp. at 1320. However, in refusing such intervention, the court stated: "Mink clearly holds that absent
allegations of fraud or subterfuge the court is not to look beyond the fact of procedurally proper classification of documents pursuant to Executive Order." Id. (emphasis
added). However, the possibility of more active review by the court in such circumstances is strongly negatived by Justice Stewart's statement in his concurring opinion
that the executive order exemption "provides no means to question an Executive decision to stamp a document 'secret,' however cynical, myopic, or even corrupt that decision might have been." 410 U.S. at 95.
49. See generally Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
42 U.S.L.W. 3523 (U.S. Mar. 19, 1974), discussed in text accompanying notes 242-51
infra.
50. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1970).
51. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1970).
52. Id.
A 1972 case, California v. Richardson, 351 F. Supp. 733 (N.D. Cal. 1972), concluded that since section 1905 permits disclosure when "authorized by law," and since
disclosures made pursuant to the FOTA are provided for by law, the two statutes are
not in conflict.
53, 339 F, Supp, 467 (D.D,C, 1972).
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following the pattern of pre-1972 case law,54 held that section 1905
did not qualify information falling within its terms for protection from
disclosure under the statutory exemption because the exemption only
pertains to statutes which restrict public access to "specific government
records."5 5

Although it arguably furthers the full disclosure intent of the
FOIA, this statutory construction is of doubtful validity after the Supreme Court's recent interpretation of the executive order exemption5 6 in EPA v. Mink.57

The executive order exemption and the

statutory exemption are drawn in terms which in two important respects are quite similar inter se but which differ significantly from

the language of the remaining FOIA exemptions."
First, these
exemptions respectively protect from disclosure government "matters"
that are "specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret"5 9
and "matters" that are "specifically exempted from disclosure by

statute." 60 In addition, both determine the susceptibility of information to compulsory disclosure according to a standard extrinsic to
the FOIA.6 1 A natural construction of these two common distinguishing factors would seem to be that if a given matter were exempt from
disclosure by an executive order or a statute, then the matter would
be exempt from disclosure under the FOIA, so long as the extrinsic

standard clearly referred to the matter in question with a high degree
of specificity.

The thrust of the majority opinion in EPA v. Mink,

however, was to abandon the requirement of specificity upon a finding
that the matter in question in some sense fell within the scope of an
executive order.62

Thus the adjective "specifically," embodied in the

54. See, e.g., Grumman Aircraft Eng'r Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 425 F.2d 578
(D.C.Cir. 1970); Frankel v.SEC, 336 F. Supp. 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd on other
grounds, 460 F.2d 813 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972).
55. 339 F. Supp. at 470 (emphasis added).
56. 5U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1970).
57. 410 U.S. 73 (1973). See notes 10-49 supra and accompanying text.
58. See Epstein v. Resor, 421 F.2d 930, 933 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965
(1970).
59. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1970) (emphasis added).
60. Id. § 552(b)(3) (emphasis added).
61. On the other hand, the remainder of the exemptions are typically painted in
broad brush phrases which are generally undefined within the Act or elsewhere and
require judicial activity to fill the definitional void. Cf. Epstein v. Resor, 421 F.2d
930, 933 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970). But cf. Davis, supra note
7, at 811. For a court to apply one of these exemptions it must inquire into the nature
and character of the information in question.
62. See notes 32-34 supra and accompanying text.
In contrast to the limited judicial review which the Court found appropriate to
the executive order exemption, see notes 23-28 supra and accompanying text, the Court
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executive order exemption,6 3 was read not to have any independent
significance nor to refer to the particularity with which an executive
order must describe a document it protects from disclosure.

In his concurring opinion in Mink, Justice Stewart observed that
the rigid interpretation of the executive order exemption by the ma-

jority, which severely restricts judicial review of the classification of
documents by the executive branch, would suggest a strict interpretation of the statutory exemption due to the similar language of the two

provisions.64 The thrust of the Shapiro case and its predecessorsdisqualifying a non-disclosure statute from the statutory exemption un-

less it restricts access to specific government records 65-cannot

stand

if "specifically" does not refer to the particularity with which a re-

stricting statute must describe the documents it protects.
In light of the limited judicial activity mandated by the Mink interpretation of the executive order exemption, the application of a simi-

lar interpretation to the statutory exemption would also seem to render invalid the analysis of that exemption in a post-Mink 1973 case, Stretch

v. Weinberger.60

There, a publisher and an investigative reporter

were granted access to reports prepared by state agencies and utilized
by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) to determine whether health care facilities in the states qualified for Medicare reimbursements. Stretch was concerned with the validity of an-

other broadly worded statute-section 1306 of the Social Security
Act 67 -which restricts disclosure of government information in a man-

ner different from section 1905.

Section 1306 prohibits disclosure of

"any information" obtained pursuant to the Social Security Act except
as the Secretary of HEW "may by regulations prescribe." 68 In Stretch,

held that the intra-agency memorandum exemption, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (5) (1970), was
to be applied flexibly, 410 U.S. at 91, as a "workable formula which encompasses, balances, and protects all interests and emphasizes the fullest responsible disclosure." Id.
at 80, quoting S. REP. No. 813, at 3. See notes 101-09 infra and accompanying text.
63. 5U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1970).
64. 410 U.S. at 95 n.*. But see Stretch v. Weinberger, 34 AD. L.2d 534 (3d Cir.
Mar. 5, 1974).
65. See notes 53-55 supra and accompanying text.
66. 359 F. Supp. 702 (D.N.J. 1973), af!'d, 34 AI. L.2d 534 (3d Cir. Mar. 5,
1974).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 1306 (1970).
68. Id. In pertinent part, the statutory language reads:
No disclosure of ... any file, record, report or other paper, or any information, obtained at any time by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare ... shall be made except as the Secretary ... may by regulations prescribe. Id. § 1306(a).
Congress has recently amended the Social Security Act to permit disclosure of some
of the information previously restricted by section 1306(a). 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1306(d)(e) (Supp. 1973).
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the wide discretion vested in the Secretary to determine which documents should be disclosed was found to be inconsistent with the purpose of the statutory exemption.6 9 Reasoning that the exemption requires the non-disclosure statute to specify the protected matter rather
than delegate that determination to an administrator, the court held
that section 1306 did not prevent the disclosure mandated by the
70
FOIA.
Although the Stretch court's distaste for discretionary nondisclosure is understandable, 71 the interpretation of the statutory exemption
obliquely suggested by the Mink decision-that of limiting judicial review to a determination of whether in fact a generally applicable restricting statute exists without requiring additionally that the restricting
statute "specifically" cover the matter in question-would seem to indicate that such a statute could vest the final determination of which documents were restricted in the hands of an administrator without falling
outside the coverage of the statutory exemption of the FOIA.
Furthermore, the narrow construction given the statutory exemption in both the Shapiro and Stretch cases suffers from the fact that
the legislative history of the FOIA apparently does not permit utilizing
the broad purpose of full disclosure which underlies the FOIA to repeal other federal statutes by implication. Although both congressional reports merely rephrase the language of the exemption,7 2 reports of earlier congressional consideration of the Act reveal statements by congressmen to the effect that the proposed Act would have
no effect upon the validity of other statutes which curtail the availability of information to the public. 73 There is nothing in the FOIA as
69. 359 F. Supp. at 704. The SEC is also given discretionary authority to determine whether certain material filed with the Commission should be made available to
the public. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78x, 79v, 80a-44(a), 80b-10(a) (1970). Professor Davis
concludes that material withheld under the authority of such a statute is within the
exemption. K. DAvis § 3A.19, at 146 (Supp. 1970). Professor Davis rejects the argument that such material is exempted by the administrator and not the statute. See id.;
accord,California v. Richardson, 351 F. Supp. 733, 735 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
70. 359 F. Supp. at 704. The court cited the four district court cases which have
considered section 1306-Serchuck v. Richardson, Civ. No. 72-1212 (S.D. Fla. Nov.
28, 1972), and Schecter v. Richardson, Civ. No. 710-72 (D.D.C. July 17, 1972), ordered production of the reports, while Schecter v. Weinberger, Civ. No. 2319-72 (D.D.C.
June 7, 1973), and California v. Richardson, 351 F. Supp. 733 (N.D. Cal. 1972), forbade disclosure-without attempting to reconcile their divergent views.
71. See FOIA Note 194.
72. S. REP. No. 813, at 9; H.R. REP. No. 1497, at 10.
73. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1666 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Tudiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 6
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enacted which would controvert such statements.74

Non-disclosure

statutes 75 such as sections 1905 and 1306 have independent validity,
and until they are either explicitly repealed by Congress or the FOIA
is amended to demand specific reference to exempted documents, they
should be enforced as they now stand. 6
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

Another of the FOIA's nine exemptions protects from mandatory
disclosure "matters" which constitute "trade secrets and commercial
or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or con(1963) (statement of Senator Edward V. Long). Senator Long, chairman of the Subcommittee, stated:
Statutes which curtail the availability of information to the public are
not intended to be affected by the enactment of this bill. They provide that
specific records shall not be released unless authorized by law. Subsection
3(e) [predecessor to 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (3) (1970)] is not such an authorization
to disclose. It should be made clear that this bill in no way limits statutes specifically written with the congressional intent of curtailing the flow of information as a supplement necessary to the proper functioning of certain
agencies. Id.
74. See Note, Comments on ProposedAmendments to Section 3 of the Administrative ProcedureAct: The Freedom of Information Bill, 40 NoTIM DAB LAw. 417, 45354 (1965).
75. H.R. REP. No. 1497 states that "[there are nearly 100 statutes or parts of
statutes which restrict public access to specific Government records." Id. at 10. For
an incomplete compilation of such statutes, see STAFF OF HousE COMM. ON GovERNmEnr OPEnRaTON, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., FtnmtAL STATuTaS ON THE AvAuIAErry OF
INFORMATION (Comm. Print 1960).
76. H.R. REP. No. 1419, supra note 7, at 84-85, and the accompanying 1972 Hearings, supra note 15, at 1643-45, recommend that at least some of these non-disclosure
statutes be reviewed to determine their conflict, if any, with the full disclosure emphasis
of the FOIA.
Even where a non-disclosure statute is found to qualify as protecting information
under the statutory exemption of the FOLA, a court may interpret the non-disclosure
statute so narrowly as to place the requested information outside its scope. For example, in Tax Analysts & Advocates v. IRS, 362 F. Supp. 1298 (D.D.C. 1973), discussed
in text accompanying notes 81-84 infra, the trial court held that private letter rulings
of the IRS (see note 82 infra) were not protected from disclosure by 28 U.S.C. § 6103
(a) (1) (1970), because section 6103 applied only to "tax returns," a class of items not
encompassing "letter rulings." 362 F. Supp. at 1308. Since a private letter ruling could
not reasonably be described as a tax return, this is a valid analysis in this particular
case. However, the effectiveness of narrowly construing the non-disclosure statute to
avoid disclosure would seem to be limited to statutes which are narrowly focused, such
as section 6103 which pertains only to tax returns. It would not be useful where an all
encompassing statute, such as section 1306 of the Social Security Act, see notes 67,
68 supra and accompanying text, exempts a broad class of material from disclosure at
an administrator's discretion.
The importance of public access to private letter rulings is discussed in Reid,
Public Access to Internal Revenue Service Rulings, 41 GEO. WASH. L. RaV. 23 (1972);
Comment, Public Disclosure of Internal Revenue Service Private Letter Rulings, 40 U.
Cm. L. Rnv. 832 (1973).
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fidential.' '77 Under the prevailing standard for applying the exemption, as delineated by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Getman v. NLRB,78 information is subject to disclosure
unless it satisfies each of -three statutory criteria. The exemption encompasses only information which is (1) a trade secret or commercial
or financial, (2) obtained from a person and (3) privileged or confidential.'t Further, the exemption is usually applied so as not to protect all the information contained in such materials, "but only that information which cannot be rendered sufficiently anonymous by deletion of the filing party's name and other identifying information."80
Despite general acceptance of the Getman criteria, in 1973 two
district court judges from the same circuit have suggested different answers to a potentially far-reaching question: Is an administrative promise
to maintain the confidentiality of information, made by an agency to
a private party submitting information to the government, sufficient in
itself to exempt that material from the disclosure provisions of the
FOIA? Judge Robinson, in Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Internal Revenue Service,8 . conditionally rejected an IRS claim that unpublished
"private letter rulings '8 2 were not subject to mandatory disclosure under the FOIA, pending a further showing by the government that the
information was within the confidential information exemption. Reasoning that only information which meets each of the three statutory
criteria enumerated in Getman is exempt from disclosure under the
confidential information exemption, the court indicated that those criteria for exemption are exclusive.88 Even though the court conceded
77. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (4) (1970).
78. 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971). In Getman, law professors engaged in an
NLRB voting study sought access through the FOIA to an NLRB list containing the
names and addresses of employees eligible to vote in certain elections. The court rejected the government's claim that the confidential information exemption applies to
all information given to the government in confidence. Id. at 673.
79. Id., quoting Consumers Union of United States v. Veterans Administration,
301 F. Supp. 796, 802 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
80. National Cable Television Ass'n v. FCC, 479 F.2d 183, 195 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
See Fisher v. Renegotiation Bd., 473 F.2d 109 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Grumman Aircraft
Eng'r Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 425 F.2d 578, 580-88 (1970) (where the practice
originated); Bristol-Myers Co. v. FrC, 424 F.2d 935, 938-39 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 824 (1970); M.A. Schapiro & Co. v. SEC, 339 F. Supp. 467 (D.D.C. 1972).
81. 362 F. Supp. 1298 (D.D.C. 1973).
82. A private "letter ruling" is a "written statement issued to a taxpayer .. . by
the National Office [of the IRS] which interprets and applies the tax laws to a specific
set of facts." 26 C.F.R. § 601.201(a)(2) (1973). A private "letter ruling" should
not be confused with a "Revenue Ruling," the latter being "an official interpretation by the [Internal Revenue] Service which has been published in the Internal Revenue
Bulletin." Id. § 601.201(a) (6) (emphasis added).
83. 362 F. Supp. at 1307.
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that the requested letter rulings might arguably contain financial information obtained from a person, thus fulfilling two of the exemption's criteria, the court stated that to accept the agency's "bare" promise to a party submitting information to the government as satisfying
the third criterion of the exemption-that the information be "con-

fidential"-would render the statutory scheme of disclosure "meaningless. ' ' 4 Thus, the Tax Analysts court indicated that not only would

a government promise of confidentiality be insufficient by itself to
override the disclosure provisions of the Act, but further, that such
a promise, even where made with respect to admittedly financial information received from a person, would in some cases be insufficient
to satisfy the "confidential" criterion of the exemption.

A different result was suggested by Petkas v. Staats,8 5 in which
an attorney associated with a public interest research group sought dis-

closure under the FOIA of documents filed by certain defense contractors with the Cost Accounting Standards Board8 detailing the cost ac-

counting principles and procedures utilized by the filing corporations.8 7
Initially applying the three statutory criteria of the confidential information exemption as enumerated in Getman, Judge Parker found the

questioned documents to be "important and sensitive financial infor84. Id. at 1307 n.50; accord, Ditlow v. Volpe, 362 F. Supp. 1321, 1324 (D.D.C.
1973) (Robinson, J., using language similar to the language he used in the Tax Analysts
case); see Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 673 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Bristol-Myers Co. v.
FrC, 424 F.2d 935, 938 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970); Consumers
Union of United States v. Veterans Administration, 301 F. Supp. 796, 802 (S.D.N.Y.
1969); Katz, supra note 7, at 1263-67; Davis, supra note 7, at 787-89; cf. Barceleta
Shoo Corp. v. Compton, 271 F. Supp. 591 (D.P.R. 1967); ATroARNEY GENERAL'S MEMORAmruM 32-34; S. REP. No. 813, at 6; H.R. REP. No. 1497, at 10. See also Robles v.
EPA, 484 F.2d 843 (4th Cir. 1973). In its discussion of the medical records exemptions of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (6), the Robles court stated:
While perhaps a promise of confidentiality is a factor to be considered, it is
not enough to defeat the right of disclosure that the agency "received the file
under a pledge of confidentiality to the one who supplied it. Undertakings
of that nature cannot in and of themselves, override the Act." 484 F.2d at
846, quoting Ackerly v. Ley, 420 F.2d 1336, 1339-40 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1969);
Legal Aid Society v. Schultz, 349 F. Supp. 771, 776 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
85. 364 F. Supp. 680 (D.D.C. 1973).
86. Section 2168(g) of the Defense Production Act, 50 U.S.C. § 2168(g) (1970),
established this Board and charged it with the responsibility of promulgating cost-accounting principles to be followed by national defense contractors under certain federal
contracts.
87. 4 C.F.R. §§ 351.2 et seq. (1973) requires corporations contracting in defense
material with the federal government to reveal in a Disclosure Statement the cost-accounting principles and procedures utilized by them. Section 331.5 of those regulations
provides that if a contractor certifies that his Disclosure Statement contains trade secrets and commercial or financial information which is privileged and confidential, the
Statement will be protected and not released to the public by the government. Id.
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mation" 8 and therefore within the exemption.89 Moreover, Judge
Parker found an additional and independent ground to support nondisclosure of the documents-the government had obligated itself by
contract to refrain from disclosing the contents of the documents and
the filing corporations had relied thereon.90
Although the legislative history cited by the Petkas court indicates
that the government should be allowed to honor its pledge to maintain
the confidentiality of information submitted to it,9 the majority of previous cases considering this issue have rejected this interpretation as
inconsistent with the "plain meaning" of the statutory language 2 and
have ruled against the sufficiency of a bare "promise of confidentiality"
by the government. If such a promise could take information outside
the scope of the FOIA, "a loophole of cavernous dimensions" 9 would
be created. Any matter the government wanted to keep from the
public's view could be protected by a mere administrative promise not
to divulge. If the FOIA is to function effectively, the statutory criteria
set forth by the confidential information exemption must be held
exclusive.94
INTRA-AGENCY MEMORANDUM EXEMPTION

The FOIA further provides that "inter-agency or intra-agency
memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a
party other than an agency in litigation with the agency" 95 are exempt
from mandatory disclosure. Since an exemption for inter- or intraagency memoranda arguably could include almost any government
document, this exemption was the subject of considerable judicial attention in 1973. The previous case law concerning this exemption
88. 364 F. Supp. at 684.
89. Id. Inexplicably, the court granted complete immunity to the entire documents,
rather than following the established practice of ordering the disclosure of admittedly
confidential financial or commercial information if sufficient deletions can be made
to protect the identity of the filing party. See note 80 supra and accompanying text.
90. Id.
91. S.REI'. No. 813, at 9; H.R. REP. No. 1497, at 10. The House Report explicitly states that the confidential information exemption
would also include information which is given to the agency in confidence,
since a citizen must be able to confide in his Government. Moreover, when
the Government has obligated itself in good faith not to disclose documents
or information which it receives, it should be able to honor such obligations.
Id.
See ATTroimY GENERmA's M oRmu
32-34.
92. See authorities cited in note 84 supra.
93. Katz, supranote 7, at 1263.
94. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (1970); Davis, supra note 7, at 783-84.
95. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (5) (1970).
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embodies two judicially imposed restrictions on its scope, both of
which were recently considered.

The first and almost universally accepted limitation upon the
scope of the intra-agency memorandum exemption is that it is inapplicable to documents consisting of essentially factual material.9 6 Typical

of the FOIA cases utilizing this approach is a 1971 case, Soucie v.
David,9 7 which held that "advice, recommendations, opinions, and

other material reflecting deliberative or policy-making processes" are
protected by the memorandum exemption, "but not purely factual or
investigatory reports" unless such reports are "inextricably intertwined
in the policy-making process."98 The legislative history of the FOIA
clearly supports this fact-opinion dichotomy. 99 Some courts have fol96. See, e.g., Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Grumman
Aircraft Eng'r Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 425 F.2d 578, 582 (D.C. Cir. 1970); BristolMyers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1970); GSA v. Benson, 415
F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1969); Consumers Union of United States v. Veterans Administration, 301 F. Supp. 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal dismissed as moot, 436 F.2d
1363 (2d Cir. 1971). For a contrary but apparently unaccepted view, see Voight,
Public Access to Intra-Agency Documents: The International Paper Case, 4 NATuRAL
R.souRcus LAw. 554, 564 (1971).
97. 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
98. Id. at 1077-78; accord, Fisher v. Renegotiation Bd., 473 F.2d 109 (D.C. Cir.
1972); Long v. IRS, 349 F. Supp. 871 (W.D. Wash. 1972).
Such a distinction was used in another 1973 decision, Tax Analysts & Advocates
v. IRS, 362 F. Supp. 1298 (D.D.C. 1973), discussed in notes 81-84 supra and accompanying text, where several documents relating to the issuance of private "letter rulings," defined in note 82 supra, were ordered to be brought forward for an in camera
examination so that the court could determine whether the documents contained expressions of views used in the decision-making process and whether such views were "joined
with factual information which can and should be disentwined from the policy-making
process." Id. at 1309.
99. See S. REP. No. 813, which states:
It was pointed out in the comments of many of the agencies that it would
be impossible to have any frank discussion of legal or policy matters in
writing if all such writings were to be subjected to public scrutiny. It was
argued, and with merit, that efficiency of Government would be greatly
hampered if, with respect to legal and policy matters, all Government agencies
were prematurely forced to "operate in a fishbowl." The committee is convinced of the merits of this general proposition, but it has attempted to delimit
the exception as narrowly as consistent with efficient Government operation.
Id. at 9.
See also H.R. REP. No. 1497, at 10.
An earlier version of S. 1160, which ultimately became the FOIA, contained an
exemption that excluded "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters dealing solely with matters of law or policy." Hearings on S. 1160, S. 1336, S. 1758, and
S. 1879 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1965). Furthermore, the accompanying
Senate Report asserted that "[aUll factual material in Government records [was] to
be made available to the public." S. REP. No. 1219, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1964).
Commenting on the change to the final version of the FOIA, Congressman Moss,
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lowed this legislative history by reasoning that the underlying policy
of the exemption is to protect the free flow of advice and opinion
during an agency's decision-formulating process, and that since the dis-

closure of factual material does not directly inhibit that flow, it is not
protected by the memorandum exemption.' 0
Reaching a similar conclusion, but by an alternative approach, the
Supreme Court in EPA v. Mink'0 ' focused on the fact that the memorandum exemption protects inter- or intra-agency memoranda only insofar as they "would not be available by law to a party. . . in litigation
with the agency.'1 0 2 As previously indicated, 103 the government in
EPA v. Mink successfully resisted disclosure of six "classified" docu-

ments compiled for the President as a report of the National Security
Council concerning a proposed underground nuclear test.

As an al-

ternative basis for nondisclosure of the six "classified" documents and
as the sole justification for withholding three "unclassified" documents,
the government claimed that all nine documents were within the intraagency memorandum exemption.' 0 4 Reasoning that the discovery
Chairman of the House Committee, stated: "Once . . .action is taken, we should be
able to examine the material that went into the decision," but later admitted, "I don't
think it possible at this time to go that far in drafting language." Hearings on H.R.
5012 Before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess. 149 (1965). The Mink Court, discussing this change in language, noted:
mhe change cannot be read as suggesting that all factual material was
to be rendered exempt from compelled disclosure. Congress sensibly discarded a wooden exemption that would have meant disclosure of manifestly
private and confidential policy recommendations simply because the document
containing them also happened to contain factual data. That decision should
not be taken, however, to embrace an equally wooden exemption permitting
the withholding of factual material otherwise available on discovery merely
because it was placed in a memorandum with matters of law, policy, or opinion. 410 U.S. at 91.
100. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 824 (1970); Note, The Freedom of Information Act and the Exemption for
Intra-Agency Memoranda, 86 HARV. L. RaV. 1008, 1047 n.14 (1973), and the cases
cited therein. However, in a 1974 opinion, Montrose Corp. v. Trane, 34 AD.L.2d 181
(D.C. Cir. Jan. 21, 1974), the court refined the fact-opinion dichotomy to protect from
disclosure summaries of agency public hearings comprised in large part of compilations
of facts introduced at the hearings but prepared by agency attorneys to assist the Administrator of EPA in making a decision. Although the summaries contained factual
material, the court reasoned that the very selection of the facts and the narrowing of the
hearing record to the summary report was an evaluative process, and thus was part of
the agency's decision-making process. The court conceded that disclosure of the factual
summaries would have been required if the intra-agency memorandum exemption protected only "deliberative materials," but the court instead interpreted the exemption to
protect "deliberative processes," which in this case it held to include the factual summaries.
101. 410 U.S. 73 (1973). For a discussion of the Supreme Court's interpretation
of the executive order exemption in Mink, see notes 10-49 supra and accompanying
text.
102. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (5) (1970).
103. See notes 10-28 supra and accompanying text.
104. 410 U.S. at 85.
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rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure appropriately furnished

"rough analogies" for a court in considering whether a sought memorandum would be available by law to a party in litigation with the
agency, 10 5 the Court examined the established evidentiary case law'0 6

which recognizes a governmental privilege against discovery of "intragovernmental documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommenda-

tions, and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental policies are formulated."' 0 7

This protection is limited, how-

ever, in that solely factual material contained in deliberative memoranda and severable from other contents without distortion of meaning

is generally available for discovery by a private party.1 0 8 The Court
concluded that the memorandum exemption should be applied flex-

ibly, utilizing the same "common sense approach that has long governed private parties' discovery of such documents involved in litigation
with government agencies."'1 09
105. Id. at 86. In explaining its reference to the analogy as a "rough" one,
the Court observed that capabilities in discovery differ according to the litigation posture of the government as prosecutor, civil plaintiff, or defendant, but that the FOIA
gives no guidance as to which posture is appropriate. Id. Also, the Court observed
that the Act broadly requires disclosure of information to "a person," without further
qualification, and thus precludes by its own terms a judicial inquiry into the needs of
the information seeker, while the federal discovery rules do permit consideration of the
particularized needs of individual litigants. Id. See Note, supra note 100, at 1051
n.22.
106. 410 U.S. at 86-89.
107. Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318, 324 (D.D.C.
1966), affd per curiam sub nom. Carl Zeiss, Jena v. Clark, 384 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 952 (1967); accord, Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v.
United States, 157 F. Supp. 939, 944-46 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
108. 410 U.S. at 88.
109. Id. at 91. The suggestion that the federal discovery rules are appropriate
guidelines for interpreting the memorandum exemption has engendered some confusion.
The government in Pleasant Hill v. United States, 58 F.R.D. 97 (W.D. Mo. 1973),
argued that if the documents were exempted from disclosure by the intra-agency memorandum exemption, they were then immune from the discovery rules. The court correctly rejected this assertion and held that exemption pursuant to the FOIA does not
in and of itself create a "privilege" which disqualifies a document from discovery. See
generally Consolidated Box Co. v. United States, 34 Ai. L.2d 35 (Ct. Cl. Dec. 14,
1973) (confidentiality of information under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (4) (1970) does not
preclude a court from allowing its discovery); Secretary of Labor v. Frazee Constr. Co.,
1 OSHC 1270 (1973) (arriving at a similar result for the investigatory files exemption,
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1970)).
Another source of confusion is the relationship between the intra-agency memorandum exemption and the doctrine of executive privilege for national defense and foreign
policy matters which was discussed earlier in this Comment, see notes 10-49 supra and
accompanying text, and which has as its ultimate objective the confinement of the information protected rather than merely the uninhibited exchange of ideas within the agency
in question. In Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 478 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1973), after initially rejecting the government's claim that its withholding of an internal memorandum was

270
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Although the Court's utilization of the fact-opinion distinction is
solidly supported by the legislative history, neither that history nor the
justified by the intra-agency memorandum exemption, the court also rejected the government's independent claim of executive privilege to protect the mental processes underlying agency actions. The "mental process" aspect of executive privilege protects
all phases of the agency decision-making process and is thus supported by the same
considerations which underly the intra-agency memorandum exemption of the FOIA.
This so-called "mental process" rule of the executive privilege doctrine is most clearly
formulated in Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 40 F.R.D. 318 (D.D.C.
1966), aff'd per curiam sub nom. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena v. Clark, 384 F.2d 979 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 952 (1967) where it was stated:
Whatever its boundaries as to other types of claims not involving state secrets,
it is well established that the privilege obtains with respect to intra-governmental documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decision and policies are formulated. Id. at 324.
The Ethyl court reasoned that Mink had held the intra-agency memorandum exemption
to be a precise codification of the Executive's privilege to protect its mental processes,
coextensive with it, and hence that the privilege had no status independent from the
FOIA. 478 F.2d at 52. However, since Mink suggested that the discovery rules and
their case law were only "roughly analogous" to the intra-agency memorandum criteria
and that, although Congress legislated with this case law as a guide, it intended only
generally to incorporate it, see note 105 supra, the Ethyl court's interpretation significantly overstates the Mink holding. Notwithstanding this weakness in the Ethyl opinion, another outcome might severely cripple the FOIA's effectiveness. To allow "mental process" executive privilege a status independent from the FOIA would be to reinstate the criteria of need, to limit judicial activity to determining whether the Executive
acted in good faith, and generally to contravene the full disclosure provisions of the
FOIA. See 49 Txms L. RaV. 780, 783 (1971).
Such separate treatment of a governmental claim of "mental process" executive
privilege might also result in unfairness to the party as well as disruption of litigation
and the waste of court time seeking disclosure. In Grumman Aircraft Eng'r Corp.
v. Renegotiation Bd., 325 F. Supp. 1146 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd, 482 F.2d 710 (D.C.
Cir. 1973), several weeks after the district court had rejected the government's argument that the desired documents were protected by the intra-agency memorandum exemption to the FOIA, the government moved for a rehearing under rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, requesting the court to consider an independent claim of
executive privilege. The claim had not previously been raised during the litigation. The
district court denied the motion as untimely without considering its merits. In affirming,
the court of appeals indicated its disapproval of such tactics:
Just because the assertion of executive privilege, with its constitutional
overtones, is a matter of obvious gravity.. . and like any constitutional claim
should not be used to dispose of a case where a statutory claim can do equal
service, it hardly follows that the Government should be allowed to play cat
and mouse by withholding its most powerful cannon until after the District
Court has decided the case and then springing it on surprised opponents and
the judge. In saying this, we do not mean to suggest that this particular cannon, in the context of this case, is any more than a popgun. 482 F.2d at
722.
Thus the Court's suggestion in Mink that the memorandum exemption should be applied in a fashion similar to that long followed by parties in seeking discovery during
litigation with the government should not be construed as recognizing the "mental process" rule of the executive privilege doctrine as a valid basis for the government's
avoiding disclosure independent of the intra-agency exemption of the FOIA.
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Mink opinion explicitly provides direct guidance for the application

of this distinction.

One commentator has suggested that perhaps the

most appropriate guide is the dual policy which underlies the FOIA
and the memorandum exemption: the public is entitled to information which will enable it to deal effectively with the agencies, yet at

the same time the agency's decision-making processes should be protected by assuring a free flow of information and discussion in the
formulation of agency policies.'

Such an approach to applying the distinction provides a basis for
criticizing the outcome of a cursorily reasoned 1973 FOIA case which
inadequately applied the fact-policy distinction drawn in Mink.
In
Stokes v. Brennan,"' the circuit court ordered the Secretary of Labor
to disclose the department's Training Manuals for Compliance Safety
and Health Officers. Although the court found the memorandum exemption to be framed in "cryptic" language, the court was confident

that the document before it-an "impersonal, mass-produced statement of established policy designed to be utilized as an educational
and reference tool""-was not a "memorandum" and therefore was
not protected by the exemption. Assuming arguendo that a training
manual could aptly be described as a "memorandum," the dual policy

underlying the memorandum exemption and the FOIA nonetheless
supports disclosure of such manuals. As a practical matter, material
within such government training manuals often includes the agency's
interpretation of the substantive and procedural law, 1 3 which can be

as determinative of matters within an agency's concern as the language
of the statute itself." 4 If a citizen is to be able to deal effectively
and knowledgeably with the federal agency, that interpretive material

should be available to him. Furthermore, since training manuals are
not forums for the exchange of ideas during the policy-formulating

process,"

5

their disclosure would not inhibit the free flow of discussion

110. Note, supra note 100, at 1049.
111. 476 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1973).
112. Id. at 703-04.
113. See Davis, supra note 7, at 779. In Cuneo v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1086
(D.C. Cir. 1973), the appellant sought disclosure of those portions of the Defense Contract Audit Agency Manual which either create substantive rights and liabilities in persons affected by them or which determine the extent of such rights and liabilities.
Commenting on the appellant's request, the court noted that material within such portions of the Manual would include guidelines for what costs would be allowed, and
rules and interpretations dealing with other substantive laws. Id. at 1090. If the Manual contains such "secret law," the court ruled, the appellant had a right to disclosure.
Id. at 1090-91.
114. AiroNEY GENERAL's MBMoRANDTrm 16.
115. See Long v. IRS, 349 F. Supp. 871 (W.D. Wash. 1972).
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during the development of agency policy.
The flexible judicial approach prescribed by the Mink decision
in the application of the memorandum exemption contrasts starkly to
the "concrete standard" it prescribed for the executive order exemption." 6 The difference can be explained by examination of the
statutory language of the two exemptions. The intra-agency memorandum exemption sets a standard-whether the documents "would
not be available by law to a party . . . in litigation with the
agency""--which necessitates an active judicial inquiry to determine
whether or not the information should be disclosed. On the other
hand, the executive order exemption 1 8 is phrased in terms that assign
the disclosure decision to the Executive; the court's sole function is
to determine whether the Executive has made that decision." 9 The
former approach is consistent with the FOIA provision for de novo
judicial review, 12 and, where the language of the statute allows, as
it cearly does in the intra-agency memorandum exemption, this approach is to be preferred if such review is not to function as a rubber
21
stamp for agency decisions.'
The second judicially imposed limitation on the memorandum exemption considered by a court during 1973 is that a document is not
an intra-agency memorandum within the exemption if it contains the
"effective law" of the agency-that is, if it contains statements of
policy or interpretations of law adopted by an agency, or if it forms
the basis for a completed agency decision.' 22 In Ash Grove Cement
116. See notes 23-28 supra and accompanying text.
117. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1970).
118. Id.§ 552(b)(1).
119. See notes 23-28 supra and accompanying text. It may be argued, however,
that notwithstanding this difference in wording, the executive order exemption should
also imply a more flexible approach allowing a limited degree of judicial review of
the Executive's decision that a matter should not be disclosed. See notes 48-49 supra
and accompanying text.
120. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970).
121. S. REP. No. 813, at 8.
122. See Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698 (D.C. Cir. 1971), where the
court stated:
[PIrivate transmittals of binding agency opinions and interpretations should
not be encouraged. These are not the ideas and theories which go into the
making of the law, they are the law itself, and as such should be made available to the public. Thus, to prevent the development of secret law within
the Commission, we must require it to disclose orders and interpretations
which it actually applies in cases before it. Id. at 708.
See, e.g., American Mail Line, Ltd. v. Gulick, 411 F.2d 696, 702-03 (D.C. Cir. 1969);
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. NLRB, 346 F. Supp. 751 (D.D.C. 1972), affd mem., 480
F.2d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Davis, supra note 7, at 797; Note, supra note 100, at
1057-58.
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Co. V. FTC,123 the plaintiff sought the release of a category of documents which the court found to be expressions of opinion and internal
discussions of policy protected by the intra-agency memorandum exemption. 1 24 Nonetheless, the plaintiff contended that the documents
should still be disclosed because the FTC might have "relied upon" the
documents in determining policies and interpretations which became
the effective law of the agency.' 25 Relying upon an agency affidavit
which alleged that the documents did not constitute the basis for or
contain "secret law," and observing that none of the memoranda
sought had been issued by the FTC itself, 26 the court concluded that
the documents did not contain policy adopted by the agency and were
therefore protected from mandatory disclosure by the intra-agency
27
memorandum exemption.

In contrast, another 1973 case, Grumman Aircraft Engineering
Corp. v. Renegotiation Board, 28 utilized a minimum function test to
order the disclosure of a Regional Board report which had formed the
basis for a National, Renegotiation Board ruling.' 20 Recognizing the
dual function of the Regional Board Report-it contained advisory
opinions, recommendations and deliberations which assisted the National Board in the formulation of its policy, as well as the justification
and rationalization of the National Board's announced decision'the court effectively narrowed the scope of the intra-agency memorandum exemption. It stated the exemption's functional limitation to be
a simple one: "a document which a decision maker treats as justification for a decision communicated outside the bureaucracy.

. .

should

not be shielded from public disclosure on the ground that it was originally prepared for purposes of -a pre-decisional consultation . .

.".

If one reads the Grumman opinion as suggesting that the document
is no longer exempted from disclosure because it contains statements
of policy or interpretations of law which are either actually adopted
by an agency or form the basis for a completed decision,1 32 then its
123. 33 AD. L.2d 923 (D.D.C. Oct. 24, 1973).
124. Id. at 926.
125. Id. at 925.
126. The documents sought were predominantly communications among staff members, between staff members and the Commission, and between individual commissioners and the Commission. Id. at 926.
127. Id. at 927.
128. 482 F.2d 710 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
129. Renegotiation Board propedures are discussed in notes 196-99 infra and accompanying text.
130. 482 F.2d at 720.
131. Id. at 720-21.
132. That the opinion was based upon this analysis is indicated by the court's at-
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reasoning is consistent with previous FOIA cases. 1 3 However, the
court's utilization of temporal references, distinguishing between nondisclosable "pre-decisional" documents and disclosable "decisional"
documents," 4 indicates that the court may have been suggesting that
documents once exempted because they contain advisory opinions, recommendations, and deliberations automatically lose that exempt status
simply because the decision has been made. If such a temporal test
were intended, and if the courts so read Grumman and strictly apply
such a test, one of the purposes of the memorandum exemptionto protect free and frank discussion in the decision-making processwill be defeated. Unless the exemption continues unabated after a
decision has been finalized, the free and uninhibited exchange of ideas

and opinions will be restricted. 135 Agency personnel participating in
the decision-making process are less likely to be candid if they know
that their unadopted advice might be subject to public scrutiny as soon
as a decision is made." 6
INVESTIGATORY

FILEs

EXEMPTION

The FOIA exempts from disclosure "investigatory files compiled
for law enforcement purposes . ...
,137 Although there seems to
tempt to square its decision with that of Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FrC, 450 F.2d 698
(D.C. Cir. 1971). 482 F.2d at 719-20 n.29. In that effort the Grumman court stated:
Once there is solid reason to believe a paper is considered by a decisionmaker to be the basis for his decision and utilized as a justifying document,
it is clear the paper can no longer be said to demonstrate merely the preliminary deliberations of a decision-maker or his staff, on which publicity may
have a future chilling effect, but acquires a more formal, finished status which
a decision-maker should be more ready to have attributed to himself. Id.
(citations omitted).
133. See, e.g., GSA v. Benson, 415 F.2d 878, 881 (9th Cir. 1969); American Mail
Line, Ltd. v. Gulick, 411 F.2d 696, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1972). But see Fisher v. Renegotiation Bd., 473 F.2d 109 (D.C. Cir. 1972), which distinguished American Mall
Line because the memorandum in Fisher was not incorporated by reference in the Renegotiation Board's ruling. Id. at 115.
134. 482 F.2d at 719 n.29. The court's opinion is interspersed with temporal references such as: "Protecting the confidentiality of advice given during governmental
deliberations prior to actual promulgation of policy is . . . sensible." Id. at 718;
"Mhe public might be misled by exposure to discussions occurring before policy affecting it were actually determined." Id.; "We believe the line we draw between 'predecisional' and 'decisional' documents is fully consistent with [a previous decision]." Id.
at 719 n.29. (Emphasis added.)
135. See Fisher v. Renegotiation Bd., 473 F.2d 109, 115 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Katz,
supra note 7, at 1274.
136. See Voight, supra note 96, at 566; FOIA Note 199. But see Note, supra
note 100, at 1057-63.
137. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1970). The portion of the exemption deleted in the
text continues "except to the extent available by law to a party other than an agency."

Vol. 1974:2511

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-1973

be no dispute that admittedly investigatory files are to be protected

prior to an impending enforcement proceeding,18 the courts have disagreed as to whether the exemption continues after the proceedings
for which the information was gathered have either terminated or have

been abandoned prior to formal commencement. 3 '
One judicial approach, represented by a 1970 case, Bristol-Myers

Co. v.FTC, 40 focuses almost solely on the functional criterion for nondisclosure inherent in the phrase "law enforcement purposes," and re-

stricts the exemption to "investigatory files" which relate "to anything
4
that can fairly be characterized as an enforcement proceeding.' '
Thus, the court formulated a test which protects the file only if en-

forcement proceedings are "imminent.' 142

The court found that the

138. See, e.g., NLRB v. Clement Bros., 407 F.2d 1027, 1031 (5th Cir. 1969); Barceloneta Shoe Corp. v. Compton, 271 F. Supp. 591 (D.P.R. 1967).
139. Many of the duration disputes which have arisen would have been averted had
an earlier version of the FOA, S. 1666, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), reported in S.
REP. No. 1219, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 15-17 (1964), which exempted from disclosure
"investigatory files until they are used in or affect an action or proceeding or a private
party's effective participation therein," id. at 17, been enacted. This version of the
bill was amended at the insistence of Senator Humphrey, however, who was concerned
that the proposal might be interpreted as authorizing premature disclosure in the prehearing stage of enforcement proceedings of statements given by witnesses during the
investigatory process. 110 CONG. Rnc. 17,667 (1964).
140. 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970).
141. Id. at 939.
142. Id. In rejecting the FTC's claim to the protection of the exemption, the Bristol-Myers court admitted that there was some basis for labeling the items sought as
"law enforcement files compiled for law enforcement purposes," since the information
sought originally had been gathered with the purpose of proceeding against BristolMyers. However, the court rejected the FrC's argument that once such files fall
within the ambit of the exemption, they should continue to be so classified upon the
mere suggestion that enforcement proceedings might be instituted at some later unspecified date. Id. But see Cowles Communications, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Justice,
325 F. Supp. 726 (N.D. Cal. 1971). The Cowles court stated its position as follows:
The language of the [FOIA] is clear. It protects investigatory files compiled
for law enforcement purposes. A file is no less compiled for law enforcement
purposes because after the compilation it is decided for some reason there will
be no enforcement proceedings. Id. at 727.
Cf. Davis, supra note 7, at 800. Professor Davis foresaw that the principal problem
in interpreting this exemption would arise because investigations are often not for a
sole purpose, but for multiple purposes, or for purposes that change. Id.
For other cases adopting a construction of the investigatory files exemption similar
to that of the Bristol-Myers case, see M.A. Schapiro & Co. v. SEC, 339 F. Supp. 467
(D.D.C. 1972) (materials gathered during an SEC staff study must be disclosed because of the absence of an allegation that such materials would be a basis for any
adjudicatory action against anyone), Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21, 24 (4th Cir.
1971) (Department of Agriculture warning letters to meat processors not exempt from
disclosure because they constituted "records" of post-administrative enforcement actions), and Cooney v. Sun Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 288 F. Supp. 708 (E.D. Pa.
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sole congressional purpose in formulating this exemption was to prevent a party charged with a violation of a federal regulatory statute
from using the FOIA to obtain any earlier or greater access to investigatory files than he could have acquired through the criminal discovery
process, thereby protecting the government's case in court.148 In contrast, in Frankel v. SEC,144 a 1972 decision, the court interpreted the
same legislative history as indicating that an additional purpose was
to preserve the integrity and efficiency of agency investigatory processes by maintaining the confidentiality of investigative techniques and
sources of information. 45 Accordingly, the Frankel court found an
entire 7000-page investigatory file to be exempted from disclosure even
1968) (four year-old accident report not exempt from disclosure because appropriate
time for enforcement proceedings had passed).
143. 424 F.2d at 939. The court cited H.R. REP. No. 1497, at 11, as authority.
The House Report reads in pertinent part:
Investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes except to the
extent available by law to a private party: This exemption covers investigatory files related to enforcement of all kinds of laws, labor and securities laws
as well as criminal laws. This would include files prepared in connection
with related government litigation and adjudicative proceedings. S. 1160 is
not intended to give a party indirectly any earlier or greater access to investigatory files than he would have directly in such litigation or proceedings.
Id.
It has been argued that this portion of the House Report is drawn in broader terms
than the statutory language. Davis, supra note 7, at 799-800. This argument, however, would seem to ignore the word "related" in the first two sentences of the quoted
portion of the House Report, the presence of which could easily be read to indicate
that the Report intended only to include within the investigatory files exemption those
"files prepared in connection with. . . government litigation and adjudicative proceedings. . . ." related to "enforcement of all kinds of laws. .. ." H.R. REP. No. 1497,
at 11. According to Professor Davis' argument, the exemption by its terms protects
only "files" "compiled for law enforcement purposes"; whereas the House Report would
include 'iles" prepared for "government litigation and adjudicative proceedings" which
may include files that are not "compiled for law enforcement purposes."
Even when this narrowing counter-interpretation of the House Report is taken into
consideration, it would appear that S. RaP. No. 813 is more tightly constructed. In
reference to this exemption, it reads:
Exemption No. 7 deals with "investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes." These are files prepared by the Government agencies to
prosecute law violators. The disclosure of such files, except to the extent
available by law to a private party, could harm the Government's case in
court. Id. at 9.
However, notwithstanding this tighter language, the Senate Report's introductory remarks on the general purpose of the FOIA to establish full agency disclosure with limited exceptions suggest a caveat to construing the Senate Report as an unequivocal endorsement of the narrower "law enforcement" interpretation of the investigatory files
exemption: "It is also necessary for the very operation of our Government to allow
it to keep confidential certain material, such as the investigatory files of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation." Id. at 3.
144. 460 F.2d 813 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972).
145. Id. at 817.
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after the relevant enforcement proceedings had been terminated. 14
A result similar to that in Frankel was reached in two 1973 cases.
In Weisberg v. United States Department of Justice,147 an en banc
decision vacating and effectively reversing a panel opinion of the

same name, 148 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit denied access to the spectrographic analysis of bullet fragments
gathered by the FBI in its investigation of the assassination of the late
President Kennedy.'4 9 The seeker of the files, an author of several
books on assassinations, was not the subject of any investigation or

enforcement proceeding, nor was any other criminal or civil proceeding related to the assassination pending or contemplated. The court's
analysis relied heavily on the statutory language of the exemption and

defined the exemption's requirements in terms of criteria stated therein: whether the materials were (1) investigatory files and (2) were

compiled for law enforcement purposes.' 50 Utilizing both of these criteria, the court held that once a file is compiled for a law enforcement

purpose, it does not cease to remain an "investigatory file" merely
because for some reason there will be no enforcement proceeding.
Furthermore, in applying the "investigatory file" criterion, the court
severely limited the judicial function to a determination of whether
the administrator's classification of a file as "investigatory" is proper.' 5 '
In Aspin v. Laird,'5 2 the same circuit extended the literal statutory construction of Weisberg to a fuller consideration of the policies
underlying the investigatory files exemption and found that the exemp-

tion protected a forty-two volume report entitled "Department of the
Army Review of the Preliminary Investigations into the My Lai Inci-

dent.'1 53 The entire report was deemed entitled to protection even after
146. Id. at 818.
147. 489 F.2d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (rehearing en banc), petition for cert. filed,
42 U.S.L.W. 3526 (U.S. Jan. 23, 1974) (No. 73-1138).
148. 32 A. L.2d 540 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 28, 1973), vacated on rehearing en banc, 489
F.2d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1973), petition for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3526 (U.S. Jan. 23,
1974) (No. 73-1138).
149. Other items relating to President Kennedy's assassination, inter alia, the rifle
bullet fragments themselves, cartridge cases, and clothing worn by the President were
sought in Nichols v. United States, 325 F. Supp. 130 (D. Kan. 1971). There, one of
the reasons for not ordering disclosure of the materials was the court's holding that they
were not "records" within the meaning of the FOTA. See 1971 Developments 13839. That issue was not raised in the Weisberg case.
150. 489 F.2d at 1197.
151. This narrow view of the judicial role is of questionable validity. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(3) (1970) (which requires a de novo judicial review).
152. 33 AD. L.2d 1020 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 26, 1973).
153. Id. at 1029.
The Aspin court considered the legislative history, quoted in pertinent part in note
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the termination of enforcement proceedings, because "[flew persons
would respond candidly to investigators if they feared that their remarks
would become public record after the proceedings. Further, the investigaitve techniques of the investigating body would be disclosed to the general
public."' 54 The Aspin court did not attempt to segregate the massive
report into portions which would be innocuous and those which would
be harmful to law enforcement processes if released to the public. Instead, it chose to protect the entire contents indiscriminately. Thus,
the approach adopted by the court would seem to constitute a general
rule that once a file has been deemed an "investigatory file," its disclosure will be barred unless it is clear from the facts of the case that
the release of information from the file would in no way harm the
government's investigatory techniques.
While the conflict between the result in Bristol-Myers on the one
hand, and in Frankel and Aspin on the other, demonstrates the difficulties of relying for guidance upon a loosely drawn and often
conflicting congressional history, the Weisberg decision illustrates the
unsatisfactory result of leaning heavily on the explicit terms of the
FOIA. Weisberg, Aspin, and Frankel all support, at least as a general
rule, the continued exemption of an entire investigatory file when an
enforcement proceeding is no longer contemplated, while BristolMyers suggests that the entire contents of a file should then be subject
to disclosure. These "all or nothing" approaches will often lead to
unsatisfactory results even in ordinary circumstances. If an investigatory file is fully disclosed because of the lack of an "imminent" enforcement proceeding or automatically at the termination of such a
proceeding, the consequent revelation of the identities of informers and
volunteers of information might discourage help from similar sources
143 supra, and concluded that Congress had a two-fold purpose in enacting the investigatory files exemption:
[1] to prevent the premature disclosure of the results of an investigation so
that the government can present its strongest case in court, and
[2] to keep confidential the procedures by which the agency conducted its
investigation and by which it has obtained information .... Id.
Bristol-Myers read the same legislative history to indicate only the first purpose, while
Frankel is in accord with Aspin. See notes 140-46 supra and accompanying text.
154. 33 AD.L.2d at 1028. The goal of protecting investigative integrity is generally
the reason cited for a judicially created exception to the mandatory disclosure of "administrative staff manuals." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(C). If a government manual can
properly be classified as a "law enforcement" rather than an "administrative staff manual," the courts will generally allow the government to withhold the manuals. However,
this exception is construed narrowly and will permit the non-disclosure of the questioned
information only when the materials sought deal with law enforcement and when disclosure would be detrimental to general law enforcement purposes. This judicial exception is discussed further at notes 163-89 infra and accompanying text.
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in future investigations. Likewise, investigative techniques might be
compromised and thereby rendered ineffective. On the other hand,
after the termination of relevant enforcement proceedings, when the
government's "case in court" no longer needs protection, blanket secrecy of all the information within the file is difficult to reconcile with
the full disclosure policy of the FOIA. Any harm to the investigative
process which might result from blanket disclosure could be alleviated
by an in camera review of the entire contents of the file and selective
revelation of portions of the file deemed by the court to be innocuous.

1 55

An analysis which would have permitted selective exemption of
portions of investigatory files was suggested by the panel opinion in
the Weisberg'50 case, which was effectively reversed by the en bane
opinion discussed above. In the former opinion, Judge Kaufman interpreted the investigatory files exemption to be compatible with both
the Frankel and Bristol-Myers reasoning. The exemption was held
to be applicable only when the withholding agency sustained its burden
of proving that disclosure of the information was "likely to create a
concrete prospect of serious harm to its law enforcement efficiency
in a named case or otherwise."' 57 The court suggested that the "or
otherwise" provision of its test provided the flexibility, even after enforcement proceedings have ceased, to protect particular portions of
the files, which, if released, would prove detrimental to law enforcement processes. 5 8 Although such a reading allows the desirable re155. Such a procedure has been utilized by several courts considering other exemptions of the FOIA. See, e.g., Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698, 704 (D.C.
Cir. 1971); Grumman Aircraft Eng'r Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 425 F.2d 578, 58081 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 938-39 (D.C. Cir.
1970).
Recent decisions have formulated processes by which the risk of excising specifically exempt material from a mass of surrounding but otherwise unprotected material
can be accomplished without overburdening the courts. See notes 242-51 infra and
accompanying text.
156. Weisberg v. United States Dep't of Justice, 32 AD.L.2d 540 (D.C. Cir. Feb.
28, 1973), vacated on rehearing en banc, 489 F.2d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1973), petition for
cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3526 (U.S. Jan. 23, 1974) (No. 73-1138).
157. 32 An. L.2d at 546 (emphasis added).
158. Id. at n.6. The court noted that a sought FBI investigatory file containing
information may not be originally gathered with the intent to prosecute a particular
person, and even if so intended, may no longer be intended for such use. However,
in order to ensure future sources of information and not to endanger the privacy or
well-being of past "informers," some secrecy must be maintained. Id. The terms of
the statute, which require only that the information be compiled for "law enforcement
purposes," do not specifically require that the information even be intended for the
prosecution of anyone.
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sult of having non-damaging portions of files disclosed when secrecy
is no longer needed to protect the government's case in court, it is
achieved through somewhat strained statutory construction: the exemption for "files" must be read as "portions of files."'1 9
The problems inherent in any judicial construction of the investigatory files exemption are similar to the difficulties encountered when
considering the other provisions of the FOIA. A conflicting or inconsistent legislative history which suggests contrasting or at least differing
disclosure results1 60 is of little aid in the interpretation of a statutory
provision which is ambiguous or contrary to sound policy considerations. 161 The most efficacious remedy would seem to be a legislative
revision of the investigatory files exemption which explicitly states the
exemption's scope and duration along the lines of the original panel
opinion in the Weisberg case.162
ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF MANUALS AND INTERNAL

PERSONNEL RULES AND PRACTICES

Under the FOIA all "administrative staff manuals and instructions
to staff that affect a member of the public"' 3 are subject to disclosure.
However, "matters" which are "related solely to the internal personnel
rules and practices of an agency"' 64 are specifically exempted. In instances where a party has sought disclosure of government manuals
which instruct agency staff in the techniques and procedures for de-

tecting noncompliance with or violation of agency rules or statutes, the
government has consistently asserted that such manuals pertain to law
enforcement 65 and therefore are not within the purview of the part
159. FOIA Note 203.
160. See notes 140-46 supra and accompanying text.
161. See note 155 supra and accompanying text.
162. A general suggestion for reform is contained in H.R. REP. No. 1419, supra
note 7, at 84, which recommends that the exemption be limited to "investigatory
records" which "shall be made available to the public once an investigation has
ceased and adjudication, or the reasonable prospect thereof, has ended," providing, however, for the continued protection of informants' identities. Id. A less satisfactory
amendment, recently proposed by Senator Muskie, would protect, in part, "investigatory
records compiled for any specific law-enforcement purpose the disclosure of which is
not in the public interest." S. 1142, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(d) (1973). The Muskie
amendment obviously would allow the courts the discretion to disclose portions of investigatory files which would not compromise law enforcement procedures. However,
the "public interest" standard is so vague as to provide little guidance to the courts
in making such determinations.
163. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(C) (1970).
164. Id. § 552(b)(2).
165. See, e.g., Hawkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1972); Stokes v. Hodgson,
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of the FOTA which orders the disclosure of "administrative staff
The nature of this distinction is not described in the
manuals.""'
statute, and the legislative history is both confusing and contradictory. 16 7 Previous FOTA cases have generally resolved the law en-

forcement-administrative dichotomy in favor of mandatory disclosure. " "' They interpret the law enforcement exception narrowly, al347 F. Supp. 137i (N.D. Ga. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Stokes v.Brennan, 476 F.2d 699
(5th Cir. 1973); City of Concord v. Ambrose, 333 F. Supp. 958 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
166. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2) (C) (1970). The administrative-law enforcement dichotomy is suggested by S. REP. No. 813 where the addition of the word "administrative"
to an earlier version of the FOIA is explained as follows:
The limitation of the staff manuals and instructions affecting the public
which must be made available to the public to those which pertain to administrative matters rather than to law enforcement matters protects the traditional confidential nature of instructions to Government personnel prosecuting
violations of law in court, while permitting a public examination of the basis
for administrative action. Id. at 2.
167. S. RP. No. 813 seems to suggest that the line should be drawn between enforcement of the law in court and enforcement of the law within the agency. (See
note 166 supra for the textual basis in S. REP. No. 813 for this inference.) Drawing
the distinction at that point would, however, allow the anomalous result of forcing disclosure of an agency's instructions to a governmental unit charged with enforcement
of the law by administrative sanction while permitting similar instructions from the
same agency to be kept secret if directed at the enforcement of the same law by court
action. Davis, supra note 7, at 778-79.
H. REP. No. 1497 is also of little aid in distinguishing between law enforcement
and administrative manuals, because it does not directly address that issue. Rather,
it attempts to establish a broader category of material excluded from disclosure. See
Hawkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d 787, 794 (6th Cir. 1972). The House Report provides in
pertinent part:
[S]ubsection (b) of S. 1160 [later enacted into 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(C)
(1970)] would require agencies to make available . .. staff manuals and instructions that affect any member of the public. This material is the end
product of Federal administration. It has the force and effect of law in most
cases .... Id. at 7.
The House Report then contradicts itself and the words of the statute by explaining:
[Aln agency may not be required to make available those portions of its staff
manuals and instructions which set forth criteria or guidelines for the staff
in auditing or inspection procedures, or in the selection or handling of cases,
such as operational tactics, allowable tolerances, or criteria for defense, prosecution, or settlement of cases. Id. at 7-8.
Where the Senate and House Reports differ or are in conflict most commentators
and courts regard the Senate Report, which generally favors disclosure, as authoritative
because its wording more closely comports with the statutory language of the Act.
Also, the House Report, which tends to restrict disclosure, was formulated subsequent
to the passage of the FOTA by the Senate and, therefore, was not considered by the
Senate in its consideration of the Act. See, e.g., Hawkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d 789, 794
(6th Cir. 1972); Benson v. GSA, 289 F. Supp. 590, 595 (W.D. Wash. 1968), aff'd
on other grounds, 415 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1969). See generally Davis, supra note
7, at 809-10. (Professor Davis believes the House Report is an abuse of legislative
history.) FOLA Note 189. But cf. ATrORNEY GENERA'S MEMORANDUM.
168. See, e.g., Hawkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1972); City of Concord v.
Ambrose, 333 F. Supp. 958 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
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lowing questioned information to be withheld only when the materials
sought both pertain to law enforcement in substance and threaten detriment to general law enforcement functions if released. 1 9
In Stokes v. Brennan'"0 the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed this earlier
case law by narrowly construing the law enforcement exception to the
FOIA's administrative manual disclosure provision. The Stokes court
ordered the disclosure of materials which included the Training Manual
for Compliance Safety and Health Officers which is used to educate
officer trainees as to the overall scheme of agency standards and inspection procedures. 71' Nondisclosure of agency manuals, the court
reasoned, could be justified only to protect the secrecy of law enforcement methods and policies which, if disclosed, "would tend to defeat
the purpose of inducing maximum voluntary compliance by revealing
classes or types of violations which must be left undetected or unremidled because of limited resources."'172 The court further implied that
disclosure of such an agency manual containing information clarifying
an agency's substantive or procedural law would aid enforcement,
rather than hinder it, by encouraging knowledgeable and willing compliance with the law.' 73
As an alternative defense to asserting that the manuals sought
169. See Hawkes v. IPS, 467 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1972), where the court gave two
examples of revelations that would be detrimental to law enforcement, stating that the
"sole effect of disclosure [in this situation] would be to enable law violators to escape
detection." Id. at 795.
Thus, for example, there is reason to exempt from compulsory revelation
details of a selective enforcement policy made necessary by a lack of sufficient investigatory personnel. Similarly interrogation techniques or the mechanics of an FBI "stakeout" arrangement properly could be excluded from
disclosure .... Id.
On the other hand, Professor Davis gives examples of information which should
be made available to the public.
For instance, "guidelines for the staff in auditing" of tax returns ought
to be open to the taxpayer to the extent that they tell the auditor the position
of the Internal Revenue Service on any question of tax law. Furthermore,
contrary to what the House Committee says, I think a portion of "guidelines
for the staff . . . in the selection or handling of cases . . .or criteria for
defense, prosecution, or settlement of cases" should be open to inspection by
any party affected by them. I agree that secrecy is desirable to the extent
that policies about prosecuting depend upon such strategies as inducing maximum compliance with the least expenditure. Davis, supranote 7, at 779.
170. 476 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1973).
171. Id. at 700.
172. Id. at 702. After an in camera examination of the manuals, the court determined that
[no matter how thorough an examination and analysis an employer may
make of the manual and course material, he could not use the knowledge
attained to insulate himself from statutory penalties by complying with selected
rules while ignoring even the least substantial part of the thrust of the standards as a whole. Id.

173. Id.
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are of a law enforcement nature and therefore outside the scope of
the FOIA provision mandating disclosure of administrative manuals,
the government has often argued that the manuals are protected from
disclosure by the FOIA exemption for matters "related solely to the
internal rules and practices of an agency."' 74 Since "internal" may
modify "rules" as well as "practices," the language of -the exemption
is ambiguous, 1 5 and the courts and commentators have looked to the
legislative history for guidance. Unfortunately, the Senate Report and
the House Report are in total conflict."" The Senate Report construes
the exemption as protecting only matters concerned solely with employer-employee type relations; 177 therefore, authorities adopting the Senate Report's interpretation generally order the disclosure of manuals,17
such as the one in Stokes which contained both materials defining the
employer-employee relationship and a description of the substantive
standards and investigative procedures utilized by the agency. On the
other hand, the House Report's interpretation of the exemption would
protect "manuals of procedure for government investigators or examiners" but not matters concerned with employee relations or working
conditions.' 7 Accordingly authorities following the House Reports uniformly conclude that nondisclosure of manuals containing both types of
material is justified. 180 Reasoning briefly that the Senate Report is the
more authoritative, both because it more accurately reflects the statutory
174. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) (1970). See, e.g., Hawkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d 787 (6th
Cir. 1972); Consumers Union of United States v. Veterans Administration, 301 F.
Supp. 796, (S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal dismissed as moot, 436 F.2d 1363 (2d Cir.
1971); Benson v. GSA, 289 F. Supp. 590 (W.D. Wash. 1968), aff'd on other grounds,
415 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1969).
175. See Consumers Union of United States v. Veterans Administration, 301 F.
Supp. 796 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal dismissed as moot, 436 F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1971).
An amendment to the FOIA introduced recently by Senator Muskie proposes to
insert "internal personnel" immediately before "practices" thereby eliminating the ambiguity. S. 1142, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a) (1973). A similar amendment was suggested by the House Committee on Government Operations, H.R. REP. No. 1419, supra
note 7, at 83, and by H.R. 5425, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. §2(a) (1973).
176. See Note, The Freedom of Information Act: A CriticalReview, 38 GEo. WASH.
L. REv. 150, 153-54 (1969).

177. S. REP. No. 813, at 8.
178. See, e.g., Hawkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1972); Long v. IRS, 349
F. Supp. 871 (W.D. Wash. 1972); Benson v. GSA, 289 F. Supp. 590 (W.D. Wash.
1968), afI'd on other grounds, 415 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1969); Davis, supra note 7,
at 786; Note, supra note 74, at 445. But see Polymers, Inc. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 999
(2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1010 (1970).
179. H.R. REt'. No. 1497, at 10.
180. See, e.g., Polymers, Inc. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 1010 (1970); City of Concord v. Ambrose, 333 F. Supp. 958 (N.D. Cal.
1971); cf. ATrotNEY GENEAL'S MEMORANDUM 31.
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language and was the only report considered by both houses before the
passage of the FOIA, the Stakes court ordered the disclosure of the entire Training Manual for Compliance Safety and Health Officers.' 8 ' In
ordering disclosure, the court admitted that the manual contained at least
some material falling within the description of exempted personnel rules
and practices, 182 but did not justify its failure to require the excision of
the properly exempt portions from its order to disclose the entire
manual, a procedure generally endorsed by other courts. 8"
The narrow interpretation of the law enforcement exception to
the mandatory disclosure of "administrative staff manuals" endorsed
by the Stokes court 18 4 is necessary, since as a practical matter, material
within these manuals, which often includes the agency's interpretation
of substantive and procedural law, 85 can be as determinative of matters
within an agency's concern as the law itself. 8 6 This "end product"
of federal administration is the bureaucracy's "own form of case
law," -8" and should be revealed to afford the public the information
necessary to deal effectively and knowledgeably with the federal
agencies.' 88 Moreover, similar considerations support the Stokes
court's ruling that "manuals of procedure for government investigators
or examiners" are not protected by the FOIA's exemption for "internal
personnel rules and practices."' 8 When this encouragement of disclosure provided by the narrow construction of this exemption is tempered by a requirement of excision of material describing investigatory
procedures of an agency which would be rendered ineffective by their
public disclosure, the public's interest in obtaining information is balanced against the agency's legitimate need for secrecy in such a way
as to maximize the achievement of these two competing policy goals.
FINAL AGENCY OPINIONS

One of the FOIA's principal general disclosure provisions requires each "agency" to make available its final opinions for public

inspection and copying. 90
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Neither the commentators' 9 ' nor the

476 F.2d at 700.
Id. at 703.
Cf. Cuneo v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
See notes 170-73 supra and accompanying text.
See Davis, supra note 7, at 779.

186. H.R. RaP. No. 1497, at 7; A'roRNy GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM 16.

187.
188.
189.
190.

H.R. REP. No. 1497, at 7; cf. Davis, supra note 7, at 779.
See S. REP. No. 813, at 3; see notes 113-15 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 174-83 supraand accompanying text.
5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1970). The term "final opinion" is used without further
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courts9 2 have found guidance within the statutory language of the

FOLA or its legislative history for determining when a decision-making
body is an "agency" for purposes of this provision. Most of the authorities which have considered this question have looked to the definition
of "agency" contained in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)9 3

and have concluded that, for purposes of the FOIA, an "agency" is

"any administrative unit with substantial independent authority in the
exercise of specific [administrative] functions."' 194 Therefore, "where

substantial 'powers to act' with respect to individuals are vested,"' 9 5
there is an administrative "agency" which must disclose its "final opinions" to the public.
While it is universally conceded that large units of the govern-

ment such as the SEC or the FAA are "agencies" within the purview
of the FOIA, the government has often resisted requests for disclosure
of reports of subsidiary units, such as Regional Renegotiation Boards 9 6

(Regional Boards), contending that they are "merely advisory'

97

units

elaboration in the FOIA. The problems of defining it are discussed in 1971 Developments 139-43.
191. See, e.g., Freedman, Administrative Procedure and the Control of Foreign Direct Investment, 119 U. PA. L. Rnv. 1, 4-18 (1970); ATrORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM 4; 1971 Developments 136-38.
192. See, e.g., Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1971); International
Paper Co. v. FPC, 438 F.2d 1349, 1359 (2d Cir. 1971).
193. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (1970) which provides in part: "'agency' means each authority of the Government of the United States, whether or not it is within or subject
to review by another agency ....
194. Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See, e.g., Bannercraft
Clothing Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 42 U.S.L.W. 4203, 4208 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1974); International Paper Co. v. FPC, 438 F.2d 1349, 1359 (2d Cir. 1971); ATrORNEY GENEAL'S MEMORANUM 67. See generally 1971 Developments 136-38.
This conclusion is supported by the legislative history of the APA. See, e.g.,
STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDiciARY, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., REPORT ON THE
ADMINIsT.Arv PRocEDumRE ACT 2 (Comm. Print 1945); S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong.,
1st Sess. 10 (1945); H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1946).
195. Freedman, supranote 191, at 9.
196. Regional Renegotiation Boards were created pursuant to the Renegotiation Act,
50 U.S.C. § 1217 (1970), which provides in pertinent part:
The Board [Contract Renegotiation Board] may delegate in whole or in
part any function, power, or duty (other than its power to promulgate regulations and rules and other than its power to grant permissive exemptions . . )
to any agency of the Government, including any such agency established by
the Board, and may authorize the successive redelegation, within the limits
specified by it, of any such function, power, or duty to any agency of the
Government, including such agency established by the Board. Id. § 1217(d)
(emphasis added).
197. A non-FOIA case, Gates v. Schlesinger, 366 F. Supp. 797 (D.D.C. 1973),
found the government arguing the proposition usually promoted by its adversary. The
government contended that the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITs) was an "agency" within the meaning of the FOIA as well as an
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and not "agencies" within the meaning of the FOIA. Under some
circumstances the Contract Renegotiation Board19 8 (National Board)

will approve a clearance recommendation of a Regional Board without
opinion, thus giving the Regional Board's clearance decision, which

is disclosed to the regulated party, 199 the status of a "final opinion."
In Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp. v. Renegotiation Board,20 0

the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit concurred
in the district court's 201 conclusion that such Regional Board decisions
are in essence "final opinions" of the National Board,20 2 and proadvisory unit under the Federal Advisory Committee Act, Act of Oct. 6, 1972, 86

Stat. 770 (FACA).

The FACA expressly provides that "[e]ach advisory committee

meeting shall be open to the public," id. § 10(a)(1) unless the meeting is "concerned
with matters listed in section 552(b) of title 5 [the section containing the FOIA's nine
specific exemptions]," id. § 10(d), in which case the meetings may be closed. In order to close a forthcoming meeting, the government claimed that the meeting would
concern "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters . . ." as specified in 5
U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1970), and therefore was exempted from the open meeting requirements of the FACA. The Gates court rejected the government's argument. It cited
Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971), as authority, and concluded that
DACOWITS was "advisory only," possessing no "substantial independent authority."
366 F. Supp. at 799.
198. The National Board has the authority to recover excessive profits made by defense contractors and subcontractors. Renegotiation Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1191(c) (1970).
National Board and Regional Board procedures are discussed in readable language
in Grumman Aircraft Eng'r Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 325 F. Supp. 1146, 1148-54
(D.D.C. 1971), affd, 482 F.2d 710 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
199. In Class A renegotiation cases, 32 C.F.R. § 1471.2(b) (1972), w'here the Re-

gional Board decides that a clearance (finding of no excessive profits liability) is

proper (see id. §§ 1472.3(i), 1473.2(a) ), the National Board notifies the Regional
Board that it agrees with the Regional Board's determination (id. § 1473.2(a) ) and

the Regional Board then issues to the contractor a notice of non-liability. Id.
The above 1972 regulations governing the procedure of the National and Regional
Boards have been altered in 1973. 32 C.F.R. §§ 1471.2(b), 1472.3(i), 1473.2(a),
1498.6(a) (1973). Under the functional criteria discussed in notes 193-95 supra and
accompanying text, the 1973 regulations, which have substantially diminished the decision-making function of the Regional Boards, might allow the determination that Regional Board decisions are not "final opinions" or alternatively, that a Regional Board
is not an "agency."
200. 482 F.2d 710 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
201. 325 F. Supp. 1146 (D.D.C. 1971), afrd, 482 F.2d 710 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
202. 482 F.2d 712-13. The court of appeals regarded the Regional Board report as
its "final opinion" for several reasons: (1) the report was "prepared and signed by a
Regional Board member and... signed on behalf of the Regional Board by its chairman," id. at 713; (2) when the Regional Board decides that a clearance in this type
of case should be issued, "the report is the only document in the file it forwards to
the National Board which purports to justify the Regional Board's clearance recommendation in terms of the [applicable] statutory standards," id.; and (3) the National
Board treats the report as the Regional Board's justification for its recommendation.
Id. The court thus concluded that "the Regional Board report clearly occupies the
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ceeded to find additional grounds °3 to support disclosure of the Regional Board documents. Conceding arguendo that the documents
were not the "final opinions" of the National Board, the court reasoned
that the documents were at least the final opinions of the Regional
Board and thus subject to disclosure under the FOIA if the Regional
Boards can be considered "agencies.' 20 4 In making this determination, the court examined the functional attributes of the Regional
Boards: they have their own investigative and negotiating personnel;
they make formal recommendations to the National Board some of
which are disclosed to the regulated parties prior to the assumption
of jurisdiction by the National Board; and they are empowered to
make some types of non-reviewable decisions.20 5 Concluding that
these attributes were sufficient to make the Regional Boards "discrete
decision-producing layer[s] in the renegotiation process"20 8 and hence
"agencies" within the ambit of the FOIA, the court ordered disclosure
20 7
of the Regional Board documents.
The merit of determining whether a government unit is an
"agency" subject to the disclosure provisions of the FOIA by looking
at the unit's functional attributes is demonstrated by the 1973 case
Congress established the Cost Accounting
of Petkas v. Staats.210
Standards Board2 0 9 (CASB) as an agent of Congress to function independently of executive branch control.21 0 The CASB was directed
by Congress to promulgate cost accounting standards to be used by
defense contractors and subcontractors and by all relevant federal
agencies to determine costs under certain federal materiel contracts. 2" 1'
Promulgation of those standards by the CASB is obviously a substantial
administrative power to act which affects members of the public.
same opinion status as any document produced by a decision maker in an adjudicatorylike process and forwarded to a reviewing tribunal." Id. See 1971 Developments
139-43.

203. 482 F.2d at 713, 717.
finding were that the Regional
Boards, id. at 713, and that
U.S.C. § 552(a) (3) (1970).
for a discussion of the meaning
204. 482 F.2d at 713-14.

The two additional grounds supporting the lower court's
Board reports were the "final opinions" of the Regional
those documents were "identifiable records" within 5
Id. at 717. See text accompanying notes 215-27 infra
of "identifiable records."

205. Id. at 715.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 710.
208. 364 F. Supp. 680 (D.D.C. 1973). Another aspect of the Petkas case, its interpretation of the confidential information exemption of the FOIA, is discussed in notes
85-90 supra and accompanying text.

209. Defense Production Act, 50 U.S.C. § 2168 (1970).
210. Id.

211. Id.§ 2168(g).
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Hence, under the prevailing view212 the "final opinions" of the CASB
would be subject to the provisions of the FOIA. However, if the APA
definition of "agency," which provides in part that "agency" does not
include Congress, 18 were rigidly applied to the FOIA, the CASB, as
an agent of Congress, would be excluded from the FOIA's disclosure
provisions. Implicit in the Petkas court's rejection of just such an interpretation urged by the government, is the utilization of functional
attributes, rather than a rigid adherence to labels, to determine
whether a government unit acts as an "agency" which is subject to
the mandatory disclosure provisions of ,the FOIA. Had the Petkas
court accepted the government's contention that the source of the CASB's
authority-Congress-should determine whether the CASB should disclose its documents according to the FOTA, it would have permitted
concealment of government information by mere organizational gymnastics. If the FOIA is to enable a citizen to obtain information necessary to deal effectively and knowledgeably with his government, 21 4 the
FOIA must be applied where administrative power is actually exercised. The application of the functional analysis used in Grumman
and implied in Petkas is in accord with the full disclosure purpose
of the FOLA. Moreover, it results in public access to the "final opinions" of those government units which actually make the decisions
which affect the public.
IDENTIFIABLE RECORDS

Another of the FOTA's principal disclosure provisions requires in
part:

"Each agency, on request for identifiable records

. .

shall

make the records promptly -available to any person."21 5 Previous FOIA
cases have generally determined whether a request is one for "identifiable records" and, hence, whether an agency must disclose them, by
focusing on the degree of specificity with which the request describes
the material sought. Some of those courts have expressed the proper
measure of specificity in terms of whether the seeker has furnished
a reasonable description enabling a government employee to locate
the requested records.21 6 Using that standard, a 1973 case, Sears v.
Gottschak,s17 denied an FOLA request by a patent attorney for "all
212. See notes 193-95 supra and accompanying text.
213. 5U.S.C. § 551(1)(A) (1970).
214. See S. REP. No. 813, at 3.
215. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (3) (1970) (emphasis added).
216. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 938 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970). See also H.R. 12471, § 1(b), 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
This measure is suggested by S. REP. No. 813, at 8; and H.R. REP. No. 1497, at 9.
217. 357 F. Supp. 1327 (E.D. Va. 1973).
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abandoned patent applications"-a class consisting of over 600,000
documents accumulated over a period of 20 years.

The court indi-

cated that identification by "class," here, "all, abandoned patent applications," was not sufficiently descriptive to determine whether any
"particular" file should be disclosed.""8 Although the result in Sears

is consonant with one possible interpretation of the statutory language-that the FOIA requires a request for "identifiable records,"

not for an identifiable class of records-a different but equally supportable result is achieved by another interpretation-that a request
for an identifiable class of records whose components are identifiable
by their class membership is a request for "identifiable records." But
while it seems clear from Congress' use of the term "identifiable" in

the Act that Congress did not intend to require a request for "specific"
records or "particular"2 19 records or even "identified" records, the per-

missible breadth of a description cannot conclusively be gleaned from
a semantic analysis of the "identifiable records" language.
Even assuming that at least some requests for an identifiable class

of records meet the FOIA standard, some practical limitations on the
allowable breadth of such a request are needed if the agencies are

not to be crippled by having to respond to overbroad requests requiring massive amounts of agency manpower to identify the records
sought or to delete from those records information exempted from
mandatory disclosure by the FOIA.220 In National Cable Television
Association, Inc. [NCTA] v. Federal Communications Commission,22
the court, concerned with the proper construction of "identifiable records," took the suggestion in the legislative history of the FOIA and
looked to the federal discovery rules for guidance. 22 Reading the
218. Id. at 1328-29. The court relied upon Irons v. Schuyler, 465 F.2d 608 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1076 (1972), where the court denied a request for "all
unpublished manuscript decisions of the Patent Office"--a class of records scattered
through over three million files-referring to that request as a "broad, sweeping, indiscriminate request ... lacking any specificity." Id. at 612, quoting Irons v. Schuyler,
321 F. Supp. 628, 629 (D.D.C. 1970). For a discussion of this case see FOIA Note
189-92.
219. But see S. REP. No. 813, at 2.
220. 357 F. Supp. at 1327, 1329.
221. 479 F.2d 183 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
222. S. REP. No. 813, at 2. An examination of the discovery rules suggests that
a party seeking information may designate the documents sought by "category" as long
as the "category" is described with reasonable particularity. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ.
P. 34, 35; see generally 4A MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRocEDURE, chs. 34, 35
(1972). This requirement is generally said to be met when the description is "sufficient to apprise a man of ordinary intelligence what documents are required." C.
WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL

supra,

CoupTs § 87, at 388 (2d ed. 1970).

See 4A MooRE,

34.07, at 34-49. This standard is applied with a view toward protecting

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1974:251

FOIA's requirement that a request must be for "identifiable records"

as placing at least some of the burden of identification upon the agency
from whom the records are requested, 2 3 the NCTA court fashioned
a discovery-like standard to be used on remand to distribute the bur-

den between the agency and the requesting party. The NCTA case
involved requests for classes of documents used to formulate proposed
agency rules. The court directed that once a request for a class of
documents is made as specifically as an agency's public announcements
permit, the agency should disclose the documents in that class "[i]f

the agency has previously identified [that] class or category of documents
in the normal course of its affairs .

,2. However, if the class

of documents requested has never been segregated by the agency according to class or category, nor brought together for a common purpose, nor otherwise acted upon as a group, production will only be
required if the "agency might be able to identify that material with

reasonable effort." ' 5
Although this "reasonable effort"2 26 criterion seems an adequate
limitation to prevent sweeping categorical requests from crippling a
responding agency, the courts applying the criterion should be wary
of agency attempts to abuse it. Care should be taken to insure that

an agency's disorganization or lack of adequate indexing of agency information is discounted when determining whether a request for a
class of records will demand "unreasonable" agency effort to identify
the documents sought.227
BURDEN OF PROOF

The FOTA directs each agency upon a proper request to make
the party from whom documents are requested from an unreasonable and oppressive burden. See, e.g., DeMeulenaere v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 13 F.R.D. 134 (S.D.N.Y.
1952); Giannella, Agency Procedures Implementing the Freedom of Information Act.
A Proposalfor Uniform Regulations,23 AD. L. REv. 217, 233 (1971).
223. 479 F.2d at 190. But cf. ATroRmNY GEN~mr 's MEMORANDum 24.
224. 479 F.2d at 192.
225. Id.
226. The "reasonable effort" test for identifying the requested documents should not
be confused with the difficulty of retrieving known documents. See, e.g., Wellford v.
Hardin, 315 F. Supp. 175 (D. Md. 1970), aff'd on other grounds, 444 F.2d 21 (4th
Cir. 1971), where the court ruled that when the particular documents sought are,
known, the difficulty of their retrieval is immaterial in determining "identifiability" under the FOIA; FOIA Note 191. But see Giannella, supra note 222. Professor
Giannella interprets Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 824 (1970)-a case on which the NCTA court heavily relied, 479 F.2d at
191-as indicating that at some indefinite point, a request for known documents may
become so burdensome that an agency could refuse to gather them. Giannella, supra
note 222, at 236.
227. Cf. FOIA Note 191 n.94; 1971 Developments 153 n.105.
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available to "any person"'-without a showing of need-records which

are not within one or more of the FOIA's nine specifically stated exemptions.22 8

Upon the filing of a complaint, the appropriate federal

district court has jurisdiction to enjoin22 an agency from withholding

the requested records and to order the production of those improperly
withheld.23 ° When an agency declines to disclose the requested documents, the Act explicitly places the burden upon the agency to prove,

in a de novo judicial proceeding, 231 that the information sought is protected from mandatory disclosure by one of the Act's nine exemptions.

232

Despite the clear terms of the Act,233 trial courts have frequently
sustained as sufficient to maintain nondisclosure a conclusory assertion
by an agency that all the information sought is protected by one or
more of the Act's exemptions. 23 4 As previously noted,23 5 the Supreme
Court in EPA v. Mink 23 6 indicated that such assertions were insuffi-

cient to satisfy an agency's burden of proof when the government
claimed the applicability of an FOIA exemption. 3 7 Even though the

Mink Court rejected the necessity of conducting a mandatory in camera examination of the disputed documents in every case, 238 and thus

questioned what had become standard judicial practice in FOIA
cases,2 39 it nonetheless suggested that "[a]n agency should be given
228. 5U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970).
229. Id.

230. Id.
231. Id.
232. See id. § 552(b)(1)-(9).
233. See text accompanying note 29 supra.
234. See generally Rydstrom, Scope of Judicial Review Under Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)), of Administrative Agency's Withholding of Records, 7
A.L.R. Fm. 876 (1971); 1970 Developments 189-92.
235. See notes 101-21 supra and accompanying text.
236. 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
237. Id. at 92-93, where the Court discussed the intra-agency memorandum exemption, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1970). See notes 101-21 supra and accompanying text.
Such a conclusory assertion by an agency, however, might arguably be sufficient for
information protected by the executive order exemption (5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)
(1970)), or the statutory exemption (id. § 552(b)(3)) where Mink indicated that
Congress severely restricted the function of the courts. See notes 10-76 supra and
accompanying text.
238. 410 U.S. at 92-93. The Court stressed that in camera inspection of disputed
documents will be "necessary and appropriate" in some situations, but should not be
an "automatic' requirement in every case. Id.
239. S. 1142, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), submitted for the consideration of the
Senate on March 8, 1973 by Senator Muskie, supports automatic in camera review in
every case. Id. § I(d)(1). See H.R. 12471, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) (passed by
the House on March 14, 1974), which provides that "the court may determine the
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the opportunity, by means of detailed affidavits or oral testimony," 2 0
to fulfill the burden of proving to the satisfaction of the trial court

that all of the information sought is within the claimed exemption.2' 1'
In a 1973 case, Vaughn v. Rosen, 24 2 the Court of Appeals for

the District of Columbia Circuit, in an attempt to implement the above
suggestion of Mink, outlined an explicit procedure for testing the validity of agency claims to exemptions. In Vaughn, a law professor con-

ducting research on the Civil Service Commission (CSC) sought disclosure under the FOIA of certain CSC reports evaluating a number of
government personnel management programs. The trial court denied
disclosure of the requested documents on the basis of an agency affidavit, which did not illuminate or reveal the contents of the informa-

tion sought, but rather set forth in conclusory terms the agency's opinion that the evaluations were protected from disclosure by at least one
of three asserted exemptions.2 42 The court of appeals reversed and
remanded the case for further judicial proceedings. In so doing the

court emphasized that although the FOIA explicitly places the burden
upon the government to demonstrate that it has withheld requested in-

formation pursuant to a specific exemption, the judicial procedure
which has frequently been utilized-allowing the government to fulfill
its burden merely by averring that all the information sought, even

if it consists of large masses of material, is completely protected by
one or several of the exemptions-places this burden mainly on the

trial court.244
matter de novo and may examine the contents of any agency records in camera ..
Id. § I(d).
240. 410 U.S. at 93 (emphasis added).
241. Id.
242. 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3523 (U.S. Mar. 19,
1974), noted in 87 HAxv. L. REv. 854 (1974).
243. Id. at 822-23. The CSC claimed that the information sought was exempt from
disclosure because it (1) related solely to the internal rules and practices of an agency,
5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2) (1970); (2) constituted intra-agency memoranda, id. § 552(b)
(5); and (3) was composed of personal and medical files, the disclosure of which
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, id. § 552(b)(6).
The trial court accepted the blanket assertion by the CSC and solely on that basis
granted a summary judgment for the government. 484 F.2d at 823. In its ruling, the
trial court did not elaborate on the government's affidavit, nor did it explain which
exemptions it found to apply to what specific portions of the information sought. Such
a cursory review would seem inadequate to afford an appellate court the information
necessary for a proper review of a trial court's characterization of the factual nature
of the material in question. See generally Rydstrom, supra note 234; 1970 Developments 189-92.
244. 484 F.2d at 826. Since, by definition, the party seeking disclosure does not
know the contents of the "secret" information he seeks, he cannot argue effectively
that the documents should be disclosed pursuant to the mandatory provisions of the
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Moreover, such practice encourages agencies automatically to
claim "the broadest possible grounds for exemption for the greatest
amount of information."' 45 The strategy is to overburden the court,
thereby decreasing the efficiency of its review in the hope that some
non-exempt material will be passed over by the court and remain undisclosed.2 40 In an effort to formulate a process which would "assure

that a party's right to information is not submerged beneath governmental obfuscation and mischaracterization

'247

and which would also

FOIA. Hence, the trial court is not aided by the traditional adversary examination
of the disputed materials. Id. at 824-25.
245. Id. at 826.
246. Id. Under current procedures, there are no incentives for the agency to divulge
information voluntarily. Similarly, agencies lose very little by refusing to disclose information. As the Vaughn court noted, at worst a non-disclosing agency "will be put to
a court test stacked in its favor, the burden of which can easily be shifted to another
by simply averring that the information falls under one of several unfortunately imprecise exemptions." Id. at 826.
247. Id. In 1972, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit decided in Bannercraft Clothing Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 466 F.2d 345 (D.C. Cir.
1972), rev'd, 42 U.S.L.W. 4203 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1974) that the FOIA permitted the
exercise of a court's equitable powers to temporarily enjoin an ongoing administrative
proceeding before the Renegotiation Board (Board), pending a judicial determination
of a FOIA request for records relevant to the proceeding which were in the possession
of the Board. However, the court indicated the exercise of this equitable power is
proper in FOIA cases only if three criteria are met: (1) irreparable injury is threatened if the administrative proceeding continues without disclosure of the requested records, 466 F.2d at 355-56; (2) no adequate remedy at law is available to the requesting
party, id. at 356-59; and (3) the injunction would not be in derogation of the agency's
jurisdiction, id. at 359-61. Finding these three criteria satisfied and the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to judicial interference as serving no useful
purpose in this case, id. at 355, the court affirmed a lower court order temporarily
restraining the Board from continuing administrative renegotiation with Bannercraft.
Early in 1974, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' decision as it pertained to renegotiation cases. 42 U.S.L.W. 4203 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1974). The Supreme
Court ruled that in renegotiation proceedings where it is the design of the Renegotiation
Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1211-33 (1970), to prevent injunctive relief prior to the exhaustion of
the administrative process, a court is not permitted to exercise its equitable powers in
favor of an FOIA claim for documents until all renegotiation procedures have been
terminated. 42 U.S.L.W. at 4209. But cf. H.R. 12471, § 1(c), 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1974). Moreover, the Court concluded that the multi-level administrative
de novo review within the Board coupled with a de novo review by the Court
of Claims, 50 U.S.C. § 1218 (Supp. 1972)-the court at each level of review
being free to make new findings and no level bound by the determination of a
lower level-provides adequate protection to the private negotiation. 42 U.S.L.W. at
4211.
Despite the Supreme Court's ruling in Bannercraft preventing equitable interference in renegotiation proceedings, the Court affirmed in dicta that
[t]he broad language of the FOIA, with its obvious emphasis on disclosure
and with its exemptions carefully delineated as exceptions; the truism that
Congress knows how to deprive a court of broad equitable power when it
chooses so to do; and the fact that the Act, to a definite degree, makes the
District Court the enforcement arm of the statute, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (3), persuade us that the . . . principle of a statutorily prescribed special and exclu-
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"permit the court to efficiently and effectively" analyze and evaluate
sive remedy is not applicable to FOIA cases. With the express vesting of
equitable jurisdiction in the District Court by § 552(a), there is little to suggest.., that Congress sought to limit the inherent powers of an equity court.
Id. at 4209.
In two 1973 cases involving the application of the criteria enumerated in the circuit
court opinion in Bannercraft, the courts refused to enjoin the agency proceedings
pending judicial disposition of FOIA requests for relevant documents. Safeway Stores,
Inc. v. NLRB, 33 AD. L.2d 851 (D.D.C. Oct. 16, 1973), involved a request for a temporary restraining order to have an unfair labor practices hearing delayed until the NLRB
complied with the affirmative requirement of the FOIA that an agency make available
an index of agency orders and opinions. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (1970). The court
denied the request for the temporary restraining order holding that the burden of submitting to an agency hearing prior to gaining access to the requested index is insuffi.
cient to establish irreparable injury. Further, the court noted that the plaintiff had
an adequate remedy at law since it could, on appeal to the NLRB or the appropriate
court of appeals, raise all issues concerning the propriety of the agency proceedings.
On the same grounds, the court in Ash Grove Cement Co. v. FTC, 33 An. L.2d
923 (D.D.C. Oct. 24, 1973), refused to enjoin the FTC from conducting Clayton Act hearings pending the FTC's complete production of documents sought through
the FOIA. Moreover, the Ash Grove court distinguished Clayton Act proceedings
from the Renegotiation Act proceedings involved in Bannercraft thus suggesting that
Bannercraft may be given narrow application by the district courts. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. NLRB, 473 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Missouri Portland Cement Co.
v. FTC, 31 A. L.2d 503 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 1972).
The other reported 1973 case which considered a court's injunctive powers to enforce the FOIA, Automobile Club of Missouri v. NLRB, 33 AD. L.2d 725 (D.D.C. June
6, 1973); was in a different procedural posture from Bannercraft. Unlike Bannercra t,
this case was not at the preliminary stage of deciding whether a preliminary injunction
should issue, but at the stage of fashioning an appropriate injunctive remedy at the
termination of a final adjudication on the merits of an FOIA claim. After finding
that the NLRB had failed to issue an index required by the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552
(a)(2) (1970), the court issued a limited injunction halting the NLRB hearing until
an index of relevant NLRB opinions in a specific NLRB region where the controversy
was pending was made available.
At least three recent cases were directly concerned with another equitable discretion issue-whether a court possesses the discretion to allow the continued non-disclosure of documents once the documents are found not to come within a specific exemption of the FOIA. Robles v. EPA, 484 F.2d 843 (4th Cir. 1973). Tax Analysts &
Advocates v. IRS, 362 F. Supp. 1298 (D.D.C. 1973), and Wine Hobby, U.S.A., Inc.
v. United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, 363 F. Supp. 231 (E.D.
Pa. 1972) all rejected the government's claim that a court possesses the discretion to
refuse to order disclosure of documents found to be subject to the mandatory disclosure
provisions of the FOIA. None of the courts offered any helpful analysis to resolve
an existing dispute between the circuits as to whether such equitable discretion exists.
As of 1973, courts in the Third, Fourth, Sixth and District of Columbia Circuits and
the Committee on Government Operations, Hearings, supra note 7, at 77, had rejected
the power of the court to balance the equities while courts in the Fifth and Ninth
Circuits had affirmed the existence of such equitable discretion. See FOIA Note
178-79 n.9.
In the Supreme Court's general comments on FOIA exemptions in EPA v. Mink,
410 U.S. 73 (1973), the Court stated that the exemptions are explicitly made exclusive
by 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (1970), id. at 79, thus suggesting that the circuits which reject
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the nature of the disputed information, 48 the court laid down guide-

lines which delineate the requirements that must be met by an agency
if it is to sustain its burden of justifying the withholding of requested
information: (1) The agency must submit to the trial court a particu-

larized and specific analysis justifying its withholding, and (2) for a
large mass of documents, the government should correlate its reasons
for refusing disclosure with the specific portions of the documents
249
sought to be protected.
Although the procedures set forth by the Vaughn court place a

substantial burden on the agency attempting to avoid disclosure,250 the
burden is explicitly authorized by the Act. The procedures are too
new for their full impact to have been determined, but it is hoped
that they will discourage arbitrary and unjustified claims of exemptions

and encourage the agencies to comply voluntarily with the letter and
21
spirit of the FOIA. 5
the existence of equitable discretion to refuse to order disclosure of non-exempted documents are correct.
248. 484 F.2d at 826-28.
249. Id. at 827. The court suggested that the latter requirement would necessitate
an indexing system (which] would subdivide the document under consideration into manageable parts cross-referenced to the relevant portion of the
Government's justification. Opposing counsel should consult with a view toward eliminating from consideration those portions that are not controverted
and narrowing the scope of the court's inquiry. After the issues are focused,
the District Judge may examine and rule on each element of the itemized
list. When appealed, such an itemized ruling should be much more easily reviewed than would be the case if the government agency were permitted to
make a generalized argument in favor of exemption. Id. at 827.
250. Id. at 828.
251. Other 1973 District of Columbia Circuit cases have applied the Vaughn procedures. In Cuneo v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1973), the plaintiffs sought
disclosure of the Defense Contract Audit Agency Manual. The court of appeals ordered a remand because the trial court, even after an in camera review of the questioned documents, "made no discriminating analysis of how portions of the Manual
might differ in their purpose, nature, and content, and thus be subject to different criteria of disclosure . . . ." Id. at 1091. The trial court merely sustained the government's blanket assertion that the manual was protected because it "related solely to
the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency" (5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2)
(1970)) and constituted "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums ... ." (id. § 552
(b) (5)). The trial court rejected, likewise without explanation, the government's assertion that the materials were protected by the investigatory files exemption (id. § 552
(b) (7) ).
Preceding the Vaughn decision, but utilizing similar procedural requirements, Judge
Richey, in a memorandum order, Ash Grove Cement Co. v. FTC, 32 A. L.2d 364
(D.D.C. Feb. 24, 1973), held that the FTC ultimately bears the burden of proving the
applicability of an exemption with respect to each particular document. The court refused to review the documents in camera until the FTC described with particularity
each document for which it claimed an exemption. In addition, the FTC was ordered
to review carefully the disputed documents and to disclose to the plaintiff those portions, if any, which the FTC felt could be voluntarily revealed. In a subsequent hear-
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ing on the same case, 33 An. L.2d 923 (D.D.C. Oct. 24, 1973), occurring after the
Vaughn decision, the court accepted an agency affidavit describing the questioned documents as adequate to make unnecessary an in camera inspection of the documents
sought. The affidavits listed each document, described their contents in general terms,
and provided the court with enough information to enable it to identify which division
of the agency authored the document, the receiving division, and the areas discussed in
the documents. The court stated that "to require a more detailed affidavit from the
[FTC] would be tantamount to requiring full disclosure of the substance of the documents." Id. at 926.
See also Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 720-21 (D.C. Cir. 1973), where the
Vaughn requirements were applied in a non-FOIA case in which executive privilege
was claimed for large amounts of material. But see id. at 794-95 (Wilkey, J., dissenting), where it is argued that such procedures should apply only when statutory FOIA
exemptions are claimed.

